Many employees like their bosses, but managers still have much work to do, according to new research from staffing firm Accountemps.
Nearly two in three workers (64%) said they are happy with their supervisors, and another 29% are somewhat happy with their bosses. Only 8% of workers give their manager a thumbs down.
Yet, despite generally positive attitudes about the higher-ups, there were some areas where respondents felt their managers could improve. Topping the list were communication, cited by 37% of those polled, and recognition named by 31% of respondents.
The survey also found most professionals (67%) don’t aspire their boss’s job. Among those who want to bypass that rung of the career ladder, the primary reasons included not wanting the added stress and responsibility (45%) and a lack of desire to manage others (27%).
Thirty-four percent have left a job because of a strained relationship with a supervisor, and 17% would feel happy if their boss left the company. More than one in 10 (12%) professionals between the ages of 35 and 54 are unhappy with their boss, the largest of any age group. This group also was the most likely to have quit a job over a strained or dysfunctional relationship with a manager.
Half of workers surveyed said their boss understands the demands of their job, but 16% noted their supervisor has little understanding of their day-to-day reality. Twenty-three percent of workers consider their boss a friend, but the majority (61%) cited their relationship as strictly professional.
Workers ages 18 to 34 are most eager to move up to their manager’s position, with 56% saying they want their boss’s job compared to 34% of respondents ages 34 to 55 and 13% of those age 55 and older. Forty-nine percent of Millennials feel their boss recognizes their potential, compared to 67% of workers 55 and older.
The youngest group of workers had the most extensive wish lists. Most notably, compared to the other age groups, these professionals were more likely to want their managers to provide better communication and listening, support for career progression, recognition for accomplishments and help promoting work-life balance.
Edward Jones Sued for Second Time over Alleged Fiduciary Failures
Plaintiffs allege that Edward Jones and its officials breached their fiduciary duties failing to prudently and loyally manage the company's retirement plan investments.
A new proposed class action lawsuit filed against Edward
Jones in the U.S. District Court of Missouri accuses the firm of a number of fiduciary
breaches, including failing to adequately control investment costs on behalf of
participants and favoring the use of funds provided by the investment advisory
firm’s revenue-sharing partners.
The accusations match a previous suit filed by employees of Edward Jones, leveling similar claims that the
firm favored the use of its business partners’ products within the plan for its
own benefit.
“An employee participating in a 401(k) plan is limited to
the investment options selected by the plan’s fiduciaries,” the text of the
complaint explains. “Here, the investment committee selected and maintained the
investment options of fund companies who participated in revenue sharing, ‘shelf
space,’ or other business arrangements with Edward Jones.”
According to plaintiffs, in selecting and maintaining the
investment options of these “product partners,” or other companies which returned
a benefit to Edward Jones, the defendants “engaged in a form of self-dealing and
cost the plan participants millions of dollars.”
Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Edward Jones company
and officials breached their fiduciary duties failing to prudently and loyally
manage the plan’s investments—by selecting and maintaining the investment
options of fund companies with whom Edward Jones maintained revenue sharing
and/or other arrangements; selecting and maintaining the higher fee share
classes of identical funds; offering a money market account with a high fee and
significantly lower performance than a low fee stable value fund; and including
and maintaining an unreasonable number of high risk investment options.
“These actions/inactions cost plan participants millions of
dollars and run directly counter to the express purpose of ERISA plans, which
are designed to help provide funds for participants’ retirement,” plaintiffs
allege. Further, plaintiffs suggest that Edward Jones breached its fiduciary
duties by “failing to adequately monitor other persons to whom
management/administration of plan assets was delegated, despite the fact that
Edward Jones knew or should have known that such other fiduciaries were
imprudently allowing the plan to select and continue to offer plan participants
the higher fee share class options of the identical funds, maintain a poor
performing and high fee money market account, and select and maintain risky
investment options.”
NEXT: Telling details
from the complaint
The action seeks to recover the losses that plaintiffs say defendants are liable for under ERISA Sections 409 and 502.
According to the text of the complaint, Edward Jones
exercised discretionary authority with respect to management and administration
of the plan and/or exercised authority or control over the management and
disposition of the plan’s assets throughout the class period. The firm,
according to plaintiffs, did not seek to offload any of its required fiduciary service
to an external provider.
“Instead of delegating fiduciary responsibility for the plan
to external service providers, Edward Jones chose to internalize certain vital
aspects of this function to the Investment and Administrative Committees,” the complaint
states. This is not problematic on its face, participants acknowledge, but they
argue the plan committees actually worked with Edward Jones’ interest placed above that
of the typical participant.
Plaintiffs go on to suggest that, throughout the proposed class
period, Edward Jones “maintained revenue sharing and/or other business
arrangements with certain mutual fund companies, both formal and informal, which
led to new business partnerships in which Edward Jones granted access to the
investment option selection process for the plan in return for consideration in
the retail/client-side of their business.”
The argument continues: “Edward Jones, as an investment
adviser, has the ability to recommend or not recommend any investment it deems suitable
for its retail clients, because there is no fiduciary duty to retail clients at
this time … As a result, Edward Jones can and has entered into arrangements
with various mutual fund companies [including those on its 401(k) plan
investment menu], so that it can receive a portion of the investment fees
charged to its clients in return for recommending their partners’ products … However,
retail clients are free to pick from a wide variety of investment options. In
order to entice these mutual fund companies into these arrangements, Edward
Jones used the captive market of their own 401(k) plan, in which the menu of
investment options was totally controlled by Edward Jones and its employees
appointed to the Investment Committee.”
According to plaintiffs, this would effectively “guarantee
their business partners received investment management fees from plan participants,
who would have few options but to investment in the mutual funds of Edward Jones’
business partners.”
By this method, plaintiffs claim Edward Jones and Jones
Financial “profited by exploiting the captive market of the billions of dollars
of assets under management in the plan.”
The full text of the complaint, including more detail about
the specific investment options and pricing being challenged, is available
here.