California Plans’ Lowered Discount Rates Will Increase Pension Costs

S&P Global Ratings estimates CalPERS and CalSTRS will contribute $2 billion more a year toward pension costs.

In a report from S&P Global Ratings, the agency notes that the two largest public pension systems in the U.S.—California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS)—both have committed to lowering their discount rates without changing their funds’ asset allocations.

The CalPERS’ board voted on December 21, 2016, to lower the discount rate to 7.375% from 7.5% in the upcoming actuarial valuation for June 30, 2016; 7.25% in the 2017 valuation; and 7.0% in the 2018 valuation. Six weeks later, on February 1, 2017, the CalSTRS board decided to move slightly faster, reducing its discount rate to 7.25% in the 2016 valuation and 7.0% in 2017 from 7.5%.

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The agency explains that CalPERS’ discount rate had an inflation assumption of 2.75% and a real rate of return of 4.75%. The real rate of return is scheduled to decrease 0.5% over the next three years while the inflation assumption is stable and will be looked at in 2018 in the experience study, which CalPERS conducts every four years. The impact on the cost of earning a year of service (the normal cost) will add 1% to 3% of pay for non-safety groups and 2% to 5% for most safety groups. S&P expects most unfunded liability payments to increase 30% to 40% over the next seven years as the costs are realized. For the state alone, that will ultimately mean contributing $2 billion a year more toward pension costs.

The substantial increases in current projections are primarily the result of poor investment returns over the past two years, the report says. Reducing the discount rate will accelerate the slope of cost increases, intensifying the pressure that state and municipalities will face as growing pension contributions account for larger portions of their budget, especially in this slow revenue growth environment.

Another recent analysis from S&P Global Ratings showed many plans across the country are lowering assumed long-term rates of return in light of global economic headwinds, which further contributes to declining funded ratios and puts a strain on cities’ credit ratings.

NEXT: CalSTRS’ lowered discount rate effect on schools

According to its current report, the CalSTRS board originally had a lower expected real rate of return but higher inflation assumption than CalPERS. Its plan lowers its inflation assumption to 2.75% in the first year from 3.0%, and its real rate of return to 4.25% in the second year from 4.5%, along with other assumption adjustments its 2016 experience study calls for.

Reducing the inflation assumption softens the discount rate reduction's impact. Pension benefits are calculated based on years of service and salary, so a lower inflation assumption implies that salaries are growing more slowly than before, lowering projected benefits and total liability. So although both systems ultimately end up with the same building blocks and an identical discount rate, the different paths taken to arrive there create a difference in the severity of impact to the liability and contribution rates.

Due to the different constructs of each system's funding rules, the cost from these increased contributions will not be borne equally by all plan participants, with the state carrying a greater share of the increased cost for CalSTRS. State legislation AB 1469 sets the contribution rate for schools through fiscal year 2021. This schedule more than doubles their contribution rates from fiscal years 2015 to 2021, so S&P anticipates significant strain on schools' budgets over the next several years. However, while their contributions will continue to increase due to the phase-in of AB 1469, the effect of the discount rate change has no impact on school contribution rates until fiscal 2022. Even after that window opens, school yearly contribution changes are capped at 1% and in total can only grow by 1.15% more than the bill's current schedule. So absent further statutory changes, the resulting contribution burden to schools is both delayed and limited to a minimal 1.15% of their payroll.

Because schools will shoulder a modest amount of the discount rate reduction cost, the majority of the burden will fall on the state's shoulders. AB 1469 allows state contributions to be adjusted 0.5% per year, so CalSTRS anticipates that the state's contribution will increase by 0.5% per year for at least 10 years to compensate for the impact of the assumption changes. While 0.5% of payroll (currently about $150 million) is not a significant burden to California, the cumulative significance is quite strong. S&P estimates that at the end of 10 years, the state will be contributing $2 billion a year more into the system. So the ultimate annual cost on the state between CalSTRS and CalPERS is comparable despite their differences in funding scheme and size.

Generally, costs from changes in assumptions are borne entirely by the state, municipalities, and schools, but under the Public Employee's Pension Reform Act (PEPRA), most employees hired during or after 2013 will share approximately half of the normal cost increases, relieving 1% to 2% of pay for the increased contribution burden. Roughly 20% of CalPERS' and CalSTRS' active membership are classified under PEPRA, the report says.

401(k) Participant Sues Over Investment in Chesapeake Energy

For one thing, the participant contends the ESOP portion of the plan should have been invested in the sponsoring company’s stock, not Chesapeake Energy’s stock.

A participant in the Seventy Seven Energy Inc. Retirement & Savings Plan has filed a lawsuit on behalf of the plan and a class of similarly situated participants in the plan against the 401(k) Fiduciary Committee, other plan fiduciaries, as well as Delaware Charter Guarantee & Trust Company d/b/a Principal Trust Company.

The lawsuit alleges that Committee Defendants and Principal Trust wrongfully and imprudently invested the plan’s assets in Chesapeake Energy Corporation stock in the plan’s employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) component. The complaint says, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), ESOPs must invest in employer securities, and Chesapeake stock was not an employer security. The complaint says defendants should not have allowed the plan to make the investment.

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The lawsuit also alleges the plan’s investment in Chesapeake stock violated ERISA’s prudence requirement “and was reckless under any common-sense investment strategy.” It noted that Chesapeake is in the oil and gas industry, a very volatile, high-risk sector of the economy subject to frequent boom-and-bust cycles. The plaintiff alleges the Committee Defendants ignored the numerous warning signs that existed before the class period showing that Chesapeake was an imprudent investment for retirement assets, and instead allowed the plan to invest more than 44% of its assets in this one stock. The complaint also says Committee Defendants did not take any action as the price of Chesapeake stock declined more than 70%, from $29 per share to $7 per share during the class period, causing the plan to lose tens of millions of dollars in assets that should have been used for participants’ retirement.

According to the complaint, the Committee Defendants violated their duty under ERISA to diversify the plan’s investments. Despite recognizing that investing in a single company’s securities was “not diversified and exposes investors to a higher risk of loss,” the Committee Defendants allowed the plan to have a high percentage of its assets concentrated in Chesapeake stock and let the plan buy millions of dollars of additional shares of Chesapeake during the class period.

In addition, the complaint says, the Committee Defendants violated their duty under ERISA to accurately convey the plan’s terms to participants. The Committee Defendants told participants the ESOP’s purpose was to invest in the stock of Seventy Seven Energy, Inc., rather than truthfully telling them that the ESOP was primarily, and heavily, invested in Chesapeake stock throughout the class period.

Among other things, the lawsuit seeks an order compelling the Committee Defendants and Principal Trust to make good to the plan all losses resulting from their breaches of their fiduciary duties, including loss of vested benefits to the plan resulting from imprudent investment of the plan’s assets; to restore to the plan all profits defendants made through use of the plan’s assets; and to restore to the plan all profits which the plan and participants would have made if defendants had fulfilled their fiduciary obligations.

The complaint in Myers v. The 401(k) Fiduciary Committee for Seventy Seven Energy, Inc. is here.

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