5th Circuit Ruling Backs American Airlines in ERISA Suit

The ruling represents a legal win for American Airlines in a lawsuit alleging it provided a poorly performing capital preservation option.

The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has issued a ruling in response to the appeal of an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) lawsuit involving American Airlines.

The ruling the 5th Circuit reviewed was filed in August 2020 after more than four years of litigation testing the question of whether American Airlines should have offered a stable value fund in its 401(k) plan rather than an allegedly poorly performing fund known as the AA Credit Union Fund. The prior ruling granted summary judgment to American Airlines.

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The original complaint stated the following: “The AA Credit Union Fund effectively delivered, at all material times, the returns of a poorly managed checking account. The AA Credit Union Fund consistently failed to outpace inflation and was at all times thus a categorically imprudent retirement investment under ERISA. Therefore, the defendants violated their duties of prudence under ERISA by including it as a retirement investment option in the plan’s menu of investment options.”

Judge John McBryde of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas had previously denied class certification of the case, denied a motion to dismiss the case and rejected a proposed settlement as being insufficient. The August 2020 opinion and order addressed motions for summary judgment filed by American Airlines, its Pension Asset Administration Committee (PAAC) and American Airlines Federal Credit Union (AAFCU).

Now, the 5th Circuit has affirmed, vacated and reversed parts of that ruling. While this sounds like a mixed outcome, the appellate ruling benefits American Airlines.

Before getting into the legal analysis, the text of the appellate ruling scrutinizes the features of stable value investments compared with other capital preservation options, such as the allegedly underperforming AA Credit Union Fund.  

“A stable value fund exposes investors to greater risk than demand deposit accounts and provides only a contractually limited guarantee that participants may withdraw the book value of their accounts,” the ruling states. “And if the insurer of the fund defaults, the guarantee may be eliminated altogether. Additionally, a stable value fund contains liquidity restrictions. For instance, the fund may prohibit investors from transferring their investments into another low risk ‘competing’ option. It may also restrict when a retirement plan incorporating such a fund may withdraw its entire balance, often requiring at least 12 months’ notice before the plan can move funds into another investment vehicle. The plan added a stable value offering in late 2015.”

The appeals court then engages in some fairly complex legal analysis, starting by pointing out that it agrees with the District Court that the plaintiffs do not have standing regarding the first count in the complaint, though it reaches this conclusion for a different reason than the lower court.

“The plaintiffs’ purported injury is income that they would have received had American Airlines and the PAAC not offered the AAFCU option,” the ruling states. “Their expert has provided calculations for the returns that they would have earned had they not invested in the AAFCU option but had instead placed their money in a stable value fund. This ‘lost investment income’ is a ‘concrete’ and redressable injury for the purposes of standing. That said, another question we must ask is whether the plaintiffs would have in fact invested in a stable value fund to earn the higher returns had American Airlines and the PAAC never offered the AAFCU option. In other words, the question is whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated that it is substantially probable that the challenged acts of the defendant, not of some third party (including themselves), caused the injury. If anything, the record reveals that the plaintiffs would not have invested in a stable value fund in a counterfactual world since they did not place their money in one when given the opportunity to do so. … In sum, the District Court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing as to Count I.”

The analysis of the lower court’s ruling on Count II goes much the same way.

“In contrast to the plaintiffs’ claims against American Airlines and the PAAC, the District Court determined that plaintiffs had standing to sue AAFCU,” the ruling states. “It reasoned that the plaintiffs incurred a cognizable injury by receiving a lower interest rate in the AAFCU option than they would have received had AAFCU not dealt with plan assets. The plaintiffs averred that AAFCU used plan assets to provide loans to other AAFCU members and to make other investments for which it earned substantial income, which in turn permitted it to offer substantially higher interest rates on similar demand deposit accounts to other customers than it provided to plan participants. The plaintiffs’ expert adduced the amount that they would have earned under those higher rates. Once again, the plaintiffs have shown that they were injured and that the injury is redressable. But, once more, the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the element of causation.”

The ruling continues: “In short, the District Court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs had standing with respect to their claim against AAFCU. It is a settled rule that, in reviewing the decision of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason. Hence, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of both Count I and Count II. Given that we lack jurisdiction over those claims, we do not reach the parties’ arguments as to the merits. … The plaintiffs additionally argue that the District Court abused its discretion in denying preliminary approval of the settlement. We disagree and affirm the District Court on this issue.”

Factors That Can Cut the Cost of Fiduciary Liability Insurance

An Aon survey of insurers revealed risks they look for that affect insurability and pricing, but good governance practices have been a key factor for years.

The pace of litigation against retirement plan sponsors continues to increase, with excessive fee lawsuits dominating headlines.

Fiduciary liability insurance underwriter Euclid Specialty has said claims are so commonplace that fiduciary liability insurance could disappear. “Insurance companies have paid well over $1 billion in settlements, but this economic model cannot continue,” Euclid notes.

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Plan sponsors should know there are certain risks insurers identify that affect a plan sponsor’s insurability and the pricing of insurance. Aon recently surveyed 12 top carriers for fiduciary liability insurance to understand their views on the biggest sources of fiduciary risk within the control of fiduciaries for defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) plans subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).

According to an Aon client alert, questions about fee levels and structures, as well as processes for reviewing fees, ranked as top drivers of fiduciary liability insurance premiums. In Aon’s survey, 88% of respondents said whether the investment committee does periodic plan administration fee benchmarking reviews is a “significant” driver of insurance premiums. For DC plans, 75% of respondents said whether plans use mutual funds generating revenue sharing or subtransfer agency (sub-TA)-type revenues and 63% said mutual funds using retail share classes would be significant drivers of premiums.

Offering company stock in a DC plan with no cap on how much company stock participants can hold also rated as a top driver of fiduciary liability insurance premiums, selected by 88% of survey respondents. That figure dropped to 50% when there is a limit on the size of such investments.

Nearly 40% of respondents to Aon’s survey said whether the plan uses managed accounts has a significant impact on insurance pricing. Jay Desjardins, senior vice president at Aon, shared that one carrier explained, “The market assumed that the question referred to ‘actively’ managed accounts which are typically associated with higher fees than ‘passively’ managed accounts and, hence, the impact on insurance pricing.”

Investment advisers are viewed as a moderate influencer of premiums; however, nearly 40% of respondents said it matters which firm is a plan’s investment adviser. According to Desjardins, the same carrier explained, “If the firm doesn’t have a known reputation in the investment space or has an unproven investment history, the concern from the carrier side is the potential liability of selecting this firm over the vast available options. This becomes a bigger risk as the plans increase in size. Or if the investment adviser has a negative performance history, why is the plan taking a chance with this firm over the various other available options? The rating impact is relevant when these characteristics are a part of the decision.”

Overall, Aon says, factors that can help lower pricing “fall under the themes of good governance: having the right people and resources to act in the best interest of participants, while documenting the processes and decisions well.”

Good Governance Practices Are Key

Fiduciary liability insurers have been looking for good governance practices for years.

Speaking at the 2019 PLANSPONSOR National Conference (PSNC), Rhonda Prussack, senior vice president and head of fiduciary and employment practices liability at Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance, explained that fiduciary liability insurance is designed to protect fiduciaries from personal liability imposed on them by ERISA for breaches of fiduciary duty even if those breaches are inadvertent or unknown. For example, if plan fiduciaries get sued, a fiduciary liability policy will initially start advancing payment for defense bills. If the lawsuit is settled by plan fiduciaries, the insurer will contribute some, and sometimes all, of the settlement amount.

She said that when determining whether to insure a plan sponsor and its fiduciaries, insurance underwriters put themselves in the shoes of plaintiffs’ lawyers and seek out the types of behavior they are looking for. “For example, whether recordkeeping fees are based on plan assets or are a flat fee; whether the plan has robust processes; whether plan fiduciaries know their role, meet routinely, benchmark fees and have a process for getting rid of underperforming funds; and whether they do an RFP [request for proposals] every three to five years to make sure the plan is using the best provider and getting the best value,” she explained.

During a 2018 webinar, Nancy Ross, a partner and head of the ERISA Litigation Practice at Mayer Brown in Chicago, said that when fiduciary liability insurance carriers assess a retirement plan, a big consideration is the company’s fiduciary governance structure.

“They want to see if there is a fiduciary committee in place and if the proper delegations are in place to give the committee the authority to run the plan,” she said. “Is there an investment policy statement [IPS]? How often do they meet? Do they have plan counsel and an adviser? All of these factors would arguable mitigate the risk of being sued.”

Prussack, who also participated in the webinar, agreed, saying: “Insurers really like to see that there is as much expertise as possible in running the plans. If they have a 3(21) or 3(38) fiduciary, we would view that as a positive. As ERISA requires that plan fiduciaries exercise an expert level of prudence and the folks managing their plans typically lack that level of expertise, we would view it as a positive.”

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