Can DB Plans Offer a Better TDF Selection and Monitoring Framework?

ERISA requires plan sponsors to regularly monitor investment lineups to ensure they remain prudent—a task made more complicated by the multi-layered construction of target-date funds; a new paper points to the best practices of defined benefit plans for some guidance.

A new white paper published by P-Solve presents a simplified framework to help retirement plan fiduciaries improve the effectiveness and efficiency of target-date fund monitoring—comparing the choices of TDF managers with the established practices of major defined benefit (DB) pension plans.

According to the research, despite the complexity of target-date funds (TDFs), there are some major features common to most TDFs’ structures that should form the basis of ongoing comparisons and analysis. These are the TDF asset allocation, especially the overall level of equity exposure and the quality of equities held; the management style, including active and passive management decisions, use of proprietary funds, and strategic versus tactical asset allocation; and finally, the fairness of fees.

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If these factors are not evaluated carefully and on a manager-by-manager basis, this could result in a mismatch between an employer’s goals and participant investment results, researchers warn.

Concerning the monitoring of asset allocations, the researchers observe how the largest TDF managers “take very high levels of stock market risk in longer-term funds, ensuring that participants will bear the full brunt of any market downturn.” Even shorter-term funds have relatively high levels of stock exposure, researchers explain, higher than what is typically found in DB pension funds.

“While appropriate for some participants, heavy reliance on equities is almost certainly not suitable for as many 401(k) participants as the allocation of the largest TDF managers suggests,” P-Solve argues. “TDFs are built mainly for favorable economic and market environments.”

According to P-Solve, the typical DB pension fund, intended to operate in perpetuity, allocates approximately 60% to 70% of its assets to equities and riskier, growth-oriented asset classes, and the remainder to more conservative asset classes, including government and corporate bonds. Longer-dated TDFs, however, routinely allocate 80% or more to equities, the researchers note.

“The premise behind high-equity allocations for younger investors is reasonable: stocks tend to go up over time as the economy and company earnings grow, and investors with longer-horizons can, in theory, tolerate even sizable market declines providing recovery follows,” the paper explains. “And investors should diversify their relatively high stock of ‘human capital’ with other investments, like stocks. In some cases though, TDF stock exposure may be too high. Consider that pension funds, unlike individual 401(k) plan accounts, are intended to operate indefinitely, and can in theory take more risk than any individual.”

Researchers point out that the typical pension fund participant is approximately 50 years old and eligible to retire in about 15 years, and that the assets invested on their behalf are allocated roughly 65% to riskier investments. The same investor, if assigned to a 2030 or 2035 vintage TDF, would be exposed to 70% to 75% equities—a meaningful overweight to stocks relative to DB plans.

As the paper lays out, in 2008, when the broad U.S. stock market declined by about 37%, this overweighting harmed retirement prospects. Indeed, as the researchers note, TDF losses in 2008 were, on average, equal to or greater than those experienced by the S&P 500, despite their diversification.

Researchers go on to observe that few professionally-managed DB pension funds employ active management exclusively.

“Recognizing that some asset classes are more fertile ground for a skilled active manager than others, DB plan sponsors tend to use a blend of active and passive management,” the paper states. “The largest TDF managers by assets, other than Vanguard (naturally), have reached the opposite conclusion however: they use mostly active management.”

Researchers celebrate the fact that TDF fees continue to fall, benefitting the marketplace as a whole.

“At the end of 2016, the average asset-weighted expense ratio was 0.71%, according to Morningstar, while as recently as 2011, the average was 1%,” P-Solve notes. “This improvement is due in part to the increased use of passive funds, but also to fee reductions. The trend is positive, but on average TDF remain as, or more, expensive than actively-managed mutual funds. The average 401(k) equity mutual fund management fee is about 0.48%, and the average bond fund fee 0.35%. The average TDF fee of about 0.70% thus seems high relative to any blend of stock and bond funds, even accounting for strategic asset allocation advice, rebalancing and other features.”

TDF fees should continue to decline as assets grow, researchers conclude.

The conclusion in the paper is that the “typical TDF takes high levels of equity risk, attempts market timing that is unlikely to be rewarded on average, uses much more active management than most pension funds, and is expensive.”

“High equity exposure forced many to delay retirement, or accept a reduced standard of living in retirement, during the market crash that accompanied the Global Financial Crisis of the last decade,” P-Solve warns. “Though a repeat of this episode seems unlikely, even a less-severe downturn could result in permanent losses for those on the cusp of retirement. Retirement plan sponsors should give strong consideration to TDF managers that avoid extreme reliance on equities, refrain from excessive tactical tilts unlikely to be rewarded on average, and charge fees that are reasonable considering expected performance.”

To request a copy of the full white paper, contact article author Marc Fandetti of P-Solve at marc.fandetti@psolve.com.

Case Study Warns of Effect of Move From Public DB to Public DC

The NIRS studied the case of Palm Beach, Florida, which it says offers “an important cautionary tale on the detrimental impacts of switching public employees from DB pensions to DC accounts.”

Since 2009, nearly every state modified its retirement systems to ensure long-term sustainability, most often by increasing employee contributions, reducing benefits or both, according to the National Institute on Retirement Security (NIRS).

During these deliberations, some retirement systems faced pressure to move from defined benefit (DB) pension plans to defined contribution (DC) 401(k)-type individual accounts, in part or whole. Advocates of switching from DB to DC plans position the change as reducing employer costs for unfunded liabilities, but the move to DC accounts does nothing to reduce plan liabilities on its own. At the same time, significantly reduced retirement benefits under the DC savings plan create other workforce challenges, such as difficulty in recruiting and retaining public employees, NIRS says.

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The NIRS studied the case of Palm Beach, Florida, which it says offers “an important cautionary tale on the detrimental impacts of switching public employees from DB pensions to DC accounts.” In 2012, the Palm Beach Town Council closed its existing DB pension systems for all employees, including police and fire. Going forward “combined” retirement systems offered police officers and firefighters dramatically lower DB pensions and new individual DC retirement accounts. The move was made because financial markets experienced severe investment losses during 2001 to 2002 and 2008 to 2009. For the DB pensions of Palm Beach, this caused a dramatic increase in the town’s costs for its employee pension funds, which increased by over 600%, from $1.1 million in FY02 to $7.5 million in FY10, the NIRS explains.

According to the NIRS’ report, from the town’s budget perspective, the changes to the pension plan cut costs about 45%. According to a report by the Palm Beach Civic Association, which supported the changes, the pension reforms were anticipated to save taxpayers $6.6 million in 2012, and the annual savings would grow to $10.2 million in 2020. While the Civic Association’s study concluded that employees still would have a meaningful retirement plan, many public safety employees felt differently.

The police union calculated based on the pension reform proposal that the amount of pension income paid to future police officers would be $20,094 compared to the average benefit provided under the existing plan of $56,263.

The NIRS reports that the reaction of existing protective service officers to seeing their pension benefits frozen was swift. Retirements accelerated dramatically. Because the only way younger public safety officers could obtain a better pension was to leave the town’s police and fire departments, those existing employees who did not retire looked for opportunities in nearby local jurisdictions. The town’s two public safety pensions had covered 120 employees at the end of 2011. In addition to the 20% of the town’s workforce that retired after the change, 109 other protective officers left before retirement in the next four years. Mid-career public safety officers departed the forces in unprecedented numbers, with 53 vested police officers and firefighters departing Palm Beach’s forces from 2012 to 2015, compared to just two such experienced employees in the four years from 2008 to 2011.

The town did not anticipate the financial impact of the high attrition. For example, the NIRS firefighters had to work extremely high levels of overtime to fill staffing gaps. Also, the unprecedented loss of new and experienced public safety officers caused the town’s training cost to soar likely reaching upwards of $20 million, based on an “all in” cost estimate of $240,000 per officer to bring a new police officer through the rookie period in Florida.

The Town Council voted in 2016 to abandon the DC plans and improve the DB pensions for police officers and firefighters by raising benefits substantially and lowering the retirement age. The Council offset the cost of the police and fire DB pension improvements by increasing employee contributions and eliminating the DC plan with its employer match.

A previous report from the NIRS showed how three states’ switch from a defined benefit pension to a defined contribution plan exacerbated pension underfunding.

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