October 17, 2014 (PLANSPONSOR.com) – A federal district court judge has found a participant in the UBS Savings and Investment Plan (SIP) lacks standing to sue regarding the offering of UBS company stock in the plan’s investment lineup.
In
part due to the lack of standing, the judge also denied the participant’s
request to amend her complaint following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer that
fiduciaries of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are not entitled to any special presumption of prudence under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
U.S.
District Judge Richard J. Sullivan, of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, first noted that to establish standing, a participant must
show a personal injury was suffered due to the breaches alleged to have been committed by plan
fiduciaries. He rejected plaintiff Debra Taveras argument that a plan
participant need not show a direct, individualized injury to establish standing.
Taveras said, “All of the cases that are relevant and germane and talk about
damages in an ERISA case, talk about harm to the plan, as opposed to harm to individuals,”
and that all of the cases to which she refers look at damages at the plan level, not the
individual investor level. Sullivan said Taveras’ reliance on those cases “is
misplaced, since those decisions involved ERISA plans that managed assets on
behalf of plan participants, with each participant’s financial fortune tied to
the plan’s overall success (or failure).”
He
noted that SIP participants directed the SIP to make investments on their
behalf by choosing from a menu of investment options selected by the plan’s fiduciaries.
Each participant’s individual SIP account was comprised of only the investments
they personally selected, so it necessarily follows that Taveras can only
demonstrate a constitutionally sufficient injury by pointing to her individual
account’s specific losses during the class period. Sullivan pointed out
that the complaint only says “as a direct and proximate result of the breaches
of fiduciary duties alleged herein, the Plan, and indirectly Plaintiff and the
Plan[’s] other Participants and beneficiaries, lost a significant portion of [its]
investments meant to help Participants save for retirement.” According to
Sullivan’s opinion, the complaint does not allege whether or when Taveras,
through the SIP, purchased shares of the UBS Company Stock fund or when she
sold those shares or the amounts of those investments.
Regarding
Taveras’ motion to amend her complaint in light of the Dudenhoeffer decision, the judge noted that Taveras had filed
multiple complaints in the case, and the court already denied one such motion
to amend, saying the time for Taveras to make a motion to amend has “come and gone.”
Secondly, Sullivan said Taveras’ assertion that the Dudenhoeffer decision has changed the landscape for claims arising under
ERISA “overshoots the mark.” He noted that, in this case, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals already determined that the presumption of prudence does not apply to the SIP because the company stock fund was not required to be offered as an investment choice
by the plan document. So, the Supreme Court’s rejection of the presumption of
prudence in general has little impact on Taveras’ case.
Finally,
Sullivan said Taveras’ lack of standing renders any attempt to amend the
complaint “an exercise in futility.”
Taveras
alleged that the UBS defendants breached their duties to the SIP by failing to
eliminate the UBS Company Stock fund from the menu of investments between April
26, 2007, and October 16, 2008. At the time, UBS suffered losses due to its
heavy investments in residential mortgage-backed securities and collateralized
debt obligations.
How a Plaintiff's Attorney Views the Supreme Court Fee Case
October
17, 2014 (PLANSPONSOR.com) – The U.S. Supreme Court announced early this month
that it would review parts of an important 401(k) fee litigation case, Tibble v. Edison, sparking intense
debate across the retirement planning industry.
PLANSPONSOR sat down recently for a Q&A with the
plaintiff’s attorney in the case, Jerome Schlichter, of Schlichter, Bogard and
Denton, to discuss what’s at stake for plan sponsors, participants and service
providers.
According to case files on SCOTUS blog, the Supreme Court is limiting its review of Tibble to the following question:
“Whether a claim that ERISA [Employee Retirement Income Security Act] plan
fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence by offering higher-cost
retail-class mutual funds to plan participants, even though identical
lower-cost institution-class mutual funds were available, is barred by 29 U. S.
C. §1113(1) when fiduciaries initially chose the higher-cost mutual funds as
plan investments more than six years before the claim was filed.”
PS: Our readership seems
to be very interested in following this case and learning more about fee litigation
and ERISA-related liability. The big matter in the Supreme Court’s review of Tibble is the statute of limitations
period. Tell us about your expectations for how this last stage in a complicated
case will play out.
Schlichter: Well I certainly look at many of these
questions differently than the people quoted in your article from October 6. The question before the Supreme Court is
whether plan sponsors can get permanent immunity on an imprudent investment
decision, for all time, based on the limitations period you mention. The lower
courts have decided that, even if a plan has been shown to include a fund that
is known to be imprudent, as is the case here, it can be protected from
liability by the ERISA six-year limitations period. That’s the question the
court has to decide whether to overturn—whether it’s appropriate to give
sponsors permanent immunity from liability once the investment that is being
challenged has been on the plan menu for six years.
Contrary to what the defense lawyers have said in quotes you
and others have published, to the effect that the sky will fall for plan
sponsors and employers if the limitations period is not allowed to stand in
this case, we believe it is critical for the Supreme Court to block this permanent
immunity. ERISA’s primary function is to establish an ongoing duty for plan
sponsors to make sure plan participants receive proper monitoring and vetting
of funds for prudence. That is the law today, and that has always been the law.
Just as a broker advising clients in the non-retirement plan
context doesn’t and shouldn’t stop the monitoring process once the stocks in
question have been in the account for a certain period of time, neither should
a plan fiduciary get to stop the clock on the duty to monitor. But that’s what
will happen if the court says that, for a known imprudent fund, and I emphasize
the point that it’s a known imprudent fund we’re talking about, the duty to monitor ends after six years.
This
is a multi-billion dollar 401(k) plan, and its participants should not be
paying retail fees, and the lower courts already found that it is a fiduciary breach to have retail share classes in this plan. The 9th
Circuit upheld that finding—it’s no longer even an issue. So now, look at it from the participant perspective.
We have a number of proven-to-be-imprudent funds sitting on the menu,
in which people are paying excessive fees. The question is, then, do you give a
blank check for permanent immunity for this sponsor simply because some of those funds
were added more than six years ago? If you do eviscerate ERISA in this way, you’ll
make a mockery of any ongoing need to monitor funds for prudence.
PS: How do you respond
to the contention, if the six-year limitations period is made to be less
important, as some are saying, that employers may exit the 401(k) system?
Schlichter: I
reject the argument that the sky is falling on the 401(k) industry, and that will
still be the case if the court rules in favor of the plaintiffs in Tibble. This will instead represent an important
decision affirming the fact that, as many plan sponsors already do, the fiduciaries to a retirement plan have a permanent and ongoing duty to look at their funds to make sure they are
prudent, and they must remove funds that do not meet key standards. It’s not
going to make the sky fall, as they suggest, it’s going to protect
participants, which is what is required by ERISA in the first place.
PS: It’s been
suggested to us that the process in place at Edison was obviously not perfect,
but it was in some respects a reasonable monitoring process—they had regular meetings
and discussed funds regularly, but for whatever reason the decision was never
made to move away from certain retail share classes for some funds on the menu.
So in this sense, while the funds were imprudent, you can’t say there was no
monitoring at all going on. Sounds like you would disagree?
Schlichter: Well,
I have a few responses to that. One, the court specifically found that was not
the case on the retail funds Edison sponsors kept on the plan. That’s been
tried and decided on the facts, and that is not part of what the Supreme Court will
review.
What the court said was that, when you have a share class
that’s identical in terms of managers, stock selections, asset allocation, and
in every other respect except for fees, for a $3 billion plan to have its employees in
the higher cost share class, that’s a breach of fiduciary duty. The monitoring
was clearly not robust enough, in this sense.
The outstanding question has to do with several imprudent funds that were in the plan for more than six years when the case was filed. These funds have already been shown to suffer from the exact same
defect that the court found to be a breach of fiduciary duty for the newer
funds. For someone to say that there is evidence of appropriate monitoring, when
the court has ruled against that point, they’re just not correct.
PS: What about the
importance of the limitations period in ERISA in terms of protecting sponsors
who are, for the most part, working with the best interest of plan
participants in mind? Should there be any protection for Edison International in
this case based on the timing of the challenges? What do you think will happen
to the limitations period if the Supreme Court appeal is successful?
Schlicther: The failure
to monitor the investment menu properly and to review these funds within the six-year
period is what we contend is the breach. What’s going to happen is that plan fiduciaries,
if the decision to time-bar these claims is reversed by the Supreme Court, will know that they absolutely have to continue to monitor funds
that are included in the plan, whether they’ve been on the menu for six years
or not.
If the Supreme Court upholds the decision, on the other
hand, what’s going to happen is that plan sponsors will effectively be given
the ability to shut down the monitoring of a fund after it’s been offered for
six years. That would be completely inconsistent and at odds with what
fiduciaries are required to do for [defined contribution] plans today under ERISA, we believe.
It’s
is not an intention of ERISA to allow plans sponsors to say, ‘Okay, a certain
amount of time has passed, so now we can quit monitoring this fund or that
fund.’ We feel there is real risk of developing a blank check of immunity for
plan sponsors should the Supreme Court move to uphold.
PS: This is where
another important question comes in, whether there needs to be some sort of
triggering event or some real material change in the fund that would basically
restart the six-year limitations period? Some attorneys have suggested the ability
to challenge the initial inclusion of these later-found-to-be imprudent funds on
the plan menu is a different challenge, fundamentally, than failure to monitor. Obviously you disagree.
Schlichter: If a
Bernie Madoff fund was in this plan for more than six years, would there be any
justification for a sponsor to shut down the monitoring of that fund for all
time just because the six year period has run out? Even though we now know
Madoff was running a Ponzi scheme, the defense's argument would seem to suggest
that the sponsor would have a right to leave the fund in place simply because it
was put on the menu more than six years ago, despite the fact that it is a
known Ponzi scheme. I would ask these attorneys if this is the result that is desired.
I submit that’s not what ERISA is designed to do.
And the second point, perhaps even more important, what
about the new participant in the plan? What about somebody who wasn’t in the
plan more than six years ago? This is not some hypothetical fishing expedition;
we’re talking about known imprudent funds in this plan, suffering from the same
defect as the newer funds offered on the plan, which were already found to be a
breach.
So the employee that joined this plan a year ago, they’re
paying known excessive fees and that is now known and acknowledged by the
courts. Do we want to say that Edison is protected from any challenge by this
new participant because it decided to include the imprudent funds more than six
years before this individual started working for the company? That’s what these
attorneys’ position would lead to.
PS: Others have suggested
a participant in this position would still be able to challenge the ongoing
inclusion of this fund based on the sponsor’s failure to monitor the investment
menu—as opposed to the failure to do proper due diligence when originally
selecting the funds in question. Is there a difference between challenging the
initial and specific decision to include the fund, which must be done within
six years under ERISA, and challenging the adequacy of the ongoing monitoring process?
Schlichter: I don’t see how you can say they are asking for
anything other than permanent immunity once the statute of limitations runs out.
I would like to know, what are the other ways to challenge the funds? You can
talk about the theory, but the defense lawyers in the case have not articulated
any other way for a new plan participant to challenge the fund. There is only
one way to challenge these funds, and that is under ERISA, and that is what we
are doing.
If you look at the comments in your articles and the
comments that have been made by attorneys representing employers in these
cases, they commonly go back to the argument that the sky is going to fall on
the 401(k) system if this litigation proceeds. There is an emphasis on how
delicate the balance is between protecting participants and ensuring employers
will continue to offer retirement benefits at all.
Well, we have been hearing this argument for more than a
decade now and it has not come to pass. This case and others were originally filed
more than eight years ago at this point, and they said the sky was falling then—that
if these cases weren’t dismissed the 401(k) would start to disappear. That
position has had no support from reality. You know as well as I do that the sky
has not fallen on the 401(k) industry even as these cases, some of them, have
been argued and settled.
Participants have been reimbursed for inappropriate losses
over the years and it has not caused the destruction of the 401(k) system. You don’t
have to take my word for that, the fact is that it’s easily documented that we
have more assets in 401(k) plans today and record numbers of employers
providing defined contribution retirement benefits. So the opposite is
happening—the 401(k) system is more robust now than it ever has been in the
past. That’s not to say that there aren’t some abuses, of course.
In addition, the current [media] coverage has included many surveys
showing 401(k) fees have been coming down, and plans have been reformed and we
are having success removing retail-fee share classes from the system, and it
hasn’t caused the sky to fall. Again the opposite has happened; the sky has
brightened compared to the time before any light was being shown on these
practices.
PS: What can you tell us about the time frame for the high court's decision?
There are some deadlines coming up at the end of the year
for filing informational briefs, and I expect the case will actually be argued
in February.