Adidas Excessive Fee Complaint Fails

The unsuccessful complaint relied heavily on tabular depictions of the Adidas plan’s fees calculated as cost per 401(k) plan participant/beneficiary and as a percentage of the total plan’s assets when compared with a representative group of plans.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon has ruled in favor of the defendants in an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) lawsuit involving the Adidas Group 401(k) Savings and Retirement Plan.

Technically, the District Court accepted a magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed the case, which had claimed the Adidas plan fiduciaries paid excessive administrative and investment fees, to the alleged detriment of the plan’s participants.

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According to the complaint, for every year between 2013 and 2017, the administrative fees charged to plan participants were greater than a minimum of approximately 75% of the plan’s comparator fees, when fees are calculated as a cost per participant. And for every year between 2013 and 2017 but two, according to the now-dismissed complaint, the administrative fees charged to plan participants were greater than 80% of the plan’s comparator fees when fees are calculated as a percent of total assets.

Similar to other ERISA excessive fee lawsuits, the complaint included—and relied on—tabular depictions of the Adidas plan’s fees calculated as cost per 401(k) plan participant/beneficiary and as a percentage of the total plan’s assets when compared with a representative group of plans with a participant count from 5,000 to 9,999 and with a total value of plan assets greater than $500 million. The complaint used the charts to allege the total difference from 2013 to 2017 between Adidas’ fees and the average of its comparators, based on the total number of participants, approximated to $6.2 million. Similarly, the complaint alleged the total difference from 2013 to 2017 between Adidas’ fees and the average of its comparators, based on plan asset size, was closer to $6 million.

In recommending the complaint’s dismissal, the presiding magistrate judge notes that the lead plaintiffs have invested in just two out of roughly 25 plan offerings in dispute, these being the T. Rowe Price Retirement 2030 target-date fund (TDF) and the Eaton Vance Parametric Structured Emerging Markets investment option. Despite this, the judge notes, the plaintiffs seek relief for “all losses resulting from Adidas’s breaches of fiduciary duty,” including losses for plans they did not personally invest in. As the recommendation recounts, the defendants in turn argued that the plaintiffs lack constitutional standing for any purported injuries to funds in which they held no investments.

“The Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed the question presented here—whether plaintiffs who have invested in some funds that allegedly charge excessive fees hold Article III standing to challenge, on behalf of a putative class, alleged issues with other funds the plaintiffs personally did not invest in,” the recommendation states. “However, a majority of other courts have found constitutional standing under similar circumstances; the crux within these cases is that the plaintiffs asserted plan-wide misconduct that reached beyond their individualized injury.”

The analysis continues: “In sum, the plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that they and the putative class suffered financial injuries from the defendant’s alleged misconduct. While this injury may come in different forms for individuals who possess different plans, they all stem from the plan-wide misconduct alleged by the plaintiff here. These injuries, as alleged, are traceable to the defendant’s conduct and can be redressed by damages that the plaintiffs seek from this court. Thus, the plaintiffs have met the elements for Article III standing.”

From this technical point, nominally concluded in favor of the plaintiffs, the magistrate judge’s recommendations turn soundly in favor of the defendants.

“It is true that district courts within the Ninth Circuit have denied motions to dismiss where the complaints have alleged facts suggesting widespread fiduciary misconduct,” the recommendation states. “However, the second amended complaint contains no factual allegations surrounding the defendant’s process for selecting and monitoring investments. Instead, it merely recites concerns on how certain investments either resulted in unreasonably high administrative expenses or produced suboptimal results when compared to non-plan investments. These bare allegations do not sufficiently raise any issues surrounding the procedure of selecting investments that would dislodge the application of [White v. Chevron]. … It is true that ERISA plaintiffs, no matter how clever or diligent, will generally lack the inside information necessary to plead their claims with specificity until discovery occurs. However, federal courts cannot unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than legal conclusions couched as a factual allegation.”

The recommendation goes on to state that, at best, the plaintiffs’ argument boils down to a claim that Adidas should have foreseen that the price of the challenged investment options would go up and accordingly renegotiated its fee arrangement or sought alternative options.

“But the plaintiffs have not raised allegations suggesting that the challenged decision was imprudent at the time the fiduciaries made the decision, nor have they adequately articulated why passively managed funds serve as an appropriate benchmark for measuring the success of an actively managed fund,” the recommendation states.

The full text of the magistrate judge’s recommendation, approved by the District Court on November 30, is available here.

Positioning a Multi-Manager Portfolio for Long-Term Success

DB plan sponsors need to ensure their liability-driven investing strategies are diversified and well-positioned for years to come.

Defined benefit (DB) plans’ funded statuses have reached levels not seen since the end of 2007. The challenge for plan sponsors now is how to lock in those gains.

Plans have already allocated significant assets to their liability-driven investing (LDI) portfolios, with the average plan allocating 50% of its total portfolio to LDI, according to the Milliman 2021 Corporate Pension Funding Study. We argue that, from here, it is less about the size of the LDI allocation and more about the overall structure of the multi-manager LDI portfolio.

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By continuing to only increase allocations to existing managers, plans are exacerbating what was already high manager concentration risk and a portfolio that could only do well in a credit bull market with below normal downgrades. We believe LDI portfolios are under-diversified and ill-positioned to thrive across a range of potential environments. It is more important than ever for plan sponsors to properly diversify the LDI strategy, similarly to how they painstakingly diversify their return-seeking asset portfolios.

In our work with clients, we have identified five potential risks many plans face in their current LDI portfolios.

Risk 1: Substantial overlap in sector allocation and credit exposure among managers

Fundamental analysis of managers’ holdings helps identify which active bets managers were taking versus the benchmark and the degree to which these changed over time. From 2002 to 2021, many managers gravitated to the same areas of the market in order to generate alpha. For example, most managers were consistently underweight Treasurys in favor of off-benchmark sectors, e.g., high-yield, non-agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). When constructing a multi-manager LDI portfolio, it is important to understand these biases and avoid concentrated risks.

Active positioning largest LDI managers 2002-2021

High degree of correlation in active weights vs Barcap Long Gov/Credit index

Source: Source: eVestment. Top 14 LDI Mgrs. by assets plus Schroder Long Duration Value. Based on quarterly holdings data from 2002 Q1 through 2021 Q2 where available for each manager. Past performance is no guarantee of future performance.

Risk 2: Managers tend to be “risk on” at all times

Maintaining a persistent underweight allocation to Treasuries and an overweight allocation to BBB-rated- and A-rated bonds allowed managers to generate alpha through exposure to spread or “beta” relative to a AA discount rate. However, managers should be able to pivot in risk-off environments. Based on the data, managers appear unwilling or unable to do this. For example, coming into two risk-off periods (the fourth quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 2020) only one of 15 long-duration bond managers was meaningfully overweight Treasurys and underweight BBB-rated bonds.

Risk 3: Portfolios are not sufficiently alpha-seeking

LDI portfolios face liability drag of 1% to 1.5% per year due to the uneconomic treatment of downgrades in the discount rate. Plans must overcome this drag by earning sufficient alpha in LDI strategies. Aiming to modestly exceed a long-duration index will ensure persistent underperformance of the liability. Of the 15 managers observed, only four generated annualized alpha of 1% or more over the past 10 years.

Risk 4: Manager size limits access to the full credit universe

The Bloomberg Barclays Long U.S. Corporate Index is dominated by smaller debt issuers; 73% of borrowers have less than $5 billion of debt outstanding. Mega LDI managers have problems accessing the portion of the credit universe beyond the biggest benchmark issuers. A simple hypothetical makes this clear: Imagine a $50 billion manager takes a $500 million (1%) position in an issuer with $5 billion in total debt outstanding. The manager would have to purchase 10% of that issuer’s outstanding debt. While that’s perhaps appropriate for an event-driven hedge fund, it’s not appropriate for an LDI portfolio. The ability to access the full corporate universe may afford smaller managers opportunities to diversify downgrade risk and pursue alpha through opportunistic credit selection.

Number of issuer tickers by outstanding debt

Barclays US Long Corporate Index

Source: Bloomberg. Data as of June 30, 2021

Risk 5: Regime dependency in manager performance and correlations

Plan sponsors look for managers with repeatable alpha and low correlations to each other. Over longer periods, the performance of an LDI portfolio may reflect this. However, the correlations among managers and their performances fluctuate wildly under different market environments, such as in times of scarce liquidity or widening spreads, making it challenging to build an “optimal” portfolio without a more powerful framework that aims to secure true diversification.

To wit, in times of market stress many managers perform similarly to each other, due to their issuer concentration and underweighting of Treasurys. The diversification thought to be in the LDI portfolio might prove to not exist. It would be a shame to lose these gains in funded status if economic events were to simultaneously drive equities down, increase downgrades and reveal the under-diversification present in most LDI portfolios.

For plans to achieve the best outcomes, they should ensure their group of managers takes active decisions in all environments, including “risk-off,” and in the aggregate are nimble enough to navigate the full range of the credit universe beyond the large benchmark issuers. The task for plans now, given the increase in funded status, is to review their LDI programs and ensure they are truly diversified among alpha drivers and seeking sufficient returns to offset the liability drag.

 

Ryan Miller, CFA [Chartered Financial Analyst], ASA [Associate of the Society of Actuaries], is a solutions manager at Schroders.

This feature is to provide general information only, does not constitute legal or tax advice and cannot be used or substituted for legal or tax advice. Any opinions of the author do not necessarily reflect the stance of Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS) or its affiliates.

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