Anthem Excessive Fee Case Moves Forward

The only motion to dismiss by the defendants that the court granted concerned a claim that the 401(k) plan should have offered a stable value fund instead of a money market fund.

A federal district judge has moved forward most claims in an excessive fee case brought by participants in the Anthem 401(k) Plan.

The defendants, fiduciaries of the plan, moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, contending that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendants also assert that the plaintiffs’ claims are untimely.

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Under Count I, the plaintiffs assert that defendants breached their fiduciary duty by selecting and retaining plan investment options with excessively high fees instead of choosing identical lower-cost investment options that were available during the relevant period. Citing two prior court cases, the defendants assert they did not breach their fiduciary duty because the plan offered an array of different investments with an acceptable range of fees.

In response, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants’ reliance on the prior cases is misplaced because they do not claim any problem with the “array” of plan investment options offered, but take issue only with the cost of the investment options. The plaintiffs rely on Tibble v. Edison when arguing that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty because, from December 29, 2009, through July 22, 2013, they provided investment options at a higher cost when the same investment options were available at a lower cost. Judge Tanya Walton Pratt of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana agreed and denied the defendants motion to dismiss Count I.

Under Count II, the plaintiffs argue that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty because, prior to restructuring the investment lineup in 2013, they failed to solicit competitive bids from vendors on a flat participant fee and failed to monitor recordkeeping compensation to ensure that the plan’s recordkeeper received only reasonable compensation. The plaintiffs assert that a reasonable compensation for recordkeeping is a flat fee of $30 per participant.

But, the defendants contend the court should dismiss Count II because the plaintiffs failed to make any factual allegations that the recordkeeping fees are the result of any type of self-dealing. They argue that the plaintiffs also failed to plead any facts to support the claim that a reasonable recordkeeping fee for the plan would have been $30 per participant or that there were other vendors equally capable of providing recordkeeping services for the plan at that lower cost. They assert that without these facts, the plaintiffs’ claim is nothing more than a conclusory allegation that the plan’s recordkeeping fees were unreasonable because they were higher than what the plaintiffs thought they should be.

But, Pratt found that the plaintiffs were not required to allege that the recordkeeping fees were the result of any type of self-dealing, but were required to assert only that the defendants failed to act with prudence when failing to solicit bids and to monitor and control recordkeeping fees. She denied defendants motion to dismiss Count II.

NEXT: Offering a stable value fund and monitoring fiduciaries

Under Count III, the plaintiffs allege the defendants breached their fiduciary duty by providing and maintaining the Vanguard Prime Money Market Fund, while failing to prudently consider and make a reasoned decision regarding whether to use a stable value fund. The defendants argue that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) does not require a fiduciary to offer participants a specific investment type or even a particular mix of investment vehicles. Because participants had an array of choices across the risk spectrum, the defendants argue they cannot be faulted for offering a money market fund as a low-risk, low-return investment option instead of a higher-risk, higher-return stable value fund.

Pratt noted, and the parties agreed, that the defendants did not have a duty to absolutely provide a stable value fund instead of a money market fund. The issue is whether Defendants considered a stable value fund option and came to a reasoned decision for continuing to provide the money market fund instead. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty because an average stable value fund has dramatically outperformed the plan’s money market fund, but despite the advantages, the defendants failed to provide a stable value fund. They also contend that, had the defendants considered a stable value fund and weighed the benefits, the defendants would have removed the plan’s money market fund and provided a stable value fund. Pratt concluded that the plaintiffs’ assertion is conclusory and is not enough to state a claim. The motion to dismiss count III was granted.

Count IV asserts that Defendants are responsible for monitoring and removing fiduciaries, specifically members of the Pension Committee. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants breached their fiduciary monitoring duties by, among other things, failing to ensure that the monitored fiduciaries had a process for evaluating the plan’s administrative fees to ensure that the fees are reasonable; considered comparable investment options, including lower-cost share classes of the identical mutual funds, that charged lower fees than the plan’s mutual fund; and removed appointees who continued to maintain imprudent, excessive-cost investments and an option that did not keep up with inflation.

According to the court opinion, both parties agree that Count IV is entirely derivative of the underlying breach of fiduciary duty claims outlined in Counts I through III. So, Pratt declined to dismiss the plaintiffs’ failure to monitor claims regarding the consideration of low-cost, identical mutual funds and the evaluation of recordkeeping fees. But, she dismissed the plaintiffs’ failure to monitor claim as it relates to their contention that the defendants should have offered and considered a stable value fund.

Count V states that the Pension Committee failed to supply plan information upon request, in violation of ERISA.

The defendants argue that the court should dismiss Count V because the plaintiffs allege only that they sent two requests to the Pension Committee, who refused the requests upon delivery, but the plaintiffs failed to allege that the Pension Committee ever received their requests. In response, the plaintiffs counter that when looking at the plain text of ERISA, “receipt” is not an element of their claim under Count V.

Because the plaintiffs allege that the Pension Committee refused to accept the requests and the defendants do not allege that that failure was beyond the control of the Pension Committee, Pratt denied the motion to dismiss Count V.

In response to the defendants’ accusation that the participants’ claims were untimely, Pratt said that because the defendants do not allege that the plaintiffs had actual knowledge of defendants’ solicitation and monitoring process, the motion on this issue is denied.

District Court Moves Ahead On Oracle 401(k) Challenge

A district court judge in Colorado has sided with the recommendation made by a magistrate judge, ruling that plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim in an ERISA lawsuit targeting Oracle. 

Following a recommendation made in February by U.S. Magistrate Judge Craig B. Shaffer of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, arguing for the denial of Oracle’s motion to dismiss, a district court judge has formally ruled the company will in fact have to defend itself at trial.

The allegations in the underlying lawsuit will not be novel to retirement plan industry professionals. Plaintiffs allege the Oracle Corporation 401(k) Savings and Investment Plan “caused participants to pay recordkeeping and administrative fees to Fidelity that were multiples of the market rate available for the same services.” In addition, the complaint says, because of the way the trust agreements with Fidelity are structured, Fidelity “is the sixth largest institutional holder of Oracle stock, owning over $2 billion shares.” Thus, plaintiffs suggest, Fidelity “has the influence of a large stockholder in light of its stock ownership.” The result is that “Oracle has chosen and maintained funds from one of its largest shareholders, Fidelity, to be investment options in the plan.” Plaintiffs suggest this relationship has led to conflicts of interest that have harmed participants and retirement plan performance. 

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Commenting on the details of the challenge, district court Judge Robert E. Blackburn says he “believes this case to be extraordinarily close and exceptionally context-specific … De novo review of the allegations of the complaint, the competing arguments, and the conflicting legal authorities in this area confirms that characterization, in spades … In general, therefore, caution is indicated.”

The judge goes on: “Heeding those admonitions, the court cannot adopt defendants’ proposal to dismiss Count I of the complaint on the theory that the plan’s fee structure fell within a presumptively reasonable range of expense ratios … Contrary to defendants’ arguments, the question is not whether a revenue-sharing model is within the range of reasonable choices a fiduciary might make, but whether this revenue sharing arrangement was reasonable under all the circumstances … That determination must account for all the factors which informed the fiduciaries’ decisionmaking, not all of which are presently known to plaintiffs based, allegedly, on their wrongful failure to disclose such information.”

NEXT: Further reasons for dismissal denial 

The judge then considers whether allegations comprising Count II of the complaint are insufficient to state a plausible claim for breach of fiduciary duty in the selection of particular allegedly imprudent investments.

“Defendants insist this claim is based impermissibly on nothing more than hindsight … Plaintiffs allege two of the funds had inadequate performance histories to warrant investment in them at all,” the judge writes. “A third [fund] is alleged to have greatly underperformed its benchmark in four out of five years before it was removed from the plan. These allegations are sufficient to suggest a lack of prudence in the selection of the first two funds and in the retention of the third.”

Moreover, the judge rules, “plaintiffs allege they were not privy to the process by which defendants selected investment options, which both explains their inability to plead with more factual specificity and underscores the necessity for discovery. Defendants’ arguments for dismissal of Count IV are likewise untenable. Their suggestion that this claim must fail because the complaint fails to show the compensation paid to Fidelity was unreasonable relies on an exemption under ERISA constituting an affirmative defense which plaintiffs have no burden to disprove.”

Finally, the judge opines that defendants’ argument that revenue sharing payments are not plan “assets” ignores the “plain language of the statute, which is not so limited … Nor is this claim plainly time-barred, as plaintiffs properly have alleged they did not have actual knowledge of the allegedly prohibited transactions.”

The full text of the new opinion is here

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