Behavioral Finance Q&A with Shachar Kariv – Part 2

In the second half of a conversation with PLANSPONSOR, U.C. Berkeley Economics Department Chair Shachar Kariv discusses the importance of defining and driving “financial rationality” among workplace savers.

Shachar Kariv is the Benjamin N. Ward Professor of Economics and the Economics Department Chair at the University of California, Berkeley. Like other thought leaders, Kariv believes behavioral finance is redefining the way people save and invest money, especially for retirement.

He admits retirement readiness and decision theory aren’t exactly the standard fare for economists in his position—but the trillions of dollars Americans have saved in the form of tax-qualified retirement assets comprise a critical piece of the U.S. investing landscape, he says. Beyond this, it is vital for a healthy economic future that Americans save enough to take financial responsibility for themselves and their families in retirement.

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Finally—unlike economic challenges that so commonly break down by income quartile or political affiliation—everyone who hopes to retire one day, at any income level, must confront the difficult task of giving up resources today for the benefit of one’s future self.

Q: Why do you think the fields of financial services and retirement planning are only now getting serious about the role of behavioral psychology and decision architecture?

Well, these ideas have been around for a long time, but they are becoming more important in a world where financial services consumers drive their own choices and are presented with so much more choice and control than they had in the past.

The underlying ideas are not new. The first American Nobel Laureate in economics was the great Paul Samuelson, who worked for a long time out of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 1947 he wrote a book called Foundations of Economic Analysis. Now, the titles of most books in our field tend to oversell the content in the book—but this is an apt title for the work Samuelson accomplished in his writing about modern economics and financial decisionmaking.

It remains foundational today—he basically laid the ground for what we talked about earlier as the Theory of Revealed Preferences. He sketched out some of the earliest models that we can use to see what people’s preferences are when it comes to allocating risk—and he was big on the idea of letting the data reveal this, of looking at people’s real historical choices and behaviors to distill or boil down their true preferences.

Moreover, he did something even more interesting for the context of this conversation. He suggested that many market participants—individuals and institutions—do not actually have any consistent risk preferences to reveal. This will be familiar to your plan sponsor and adviser readers. Some participants in plans are simply incoherent about their own financial situation, so they are unable to rationally or consistently solve the various trade-offs at work in financial decisionmaking. This is one of the challenges the defined contribution retirement planning model is running straight into today. 

Q: Is it right to assume that participants who struggle with defining their risk preferences will always do worse in the savings effort?

Not necessarily, and I’ll explain. One of the attacks most commonly leveled against economists and certain economic theories is that we make our judgements based on the assumption that the financial choices people make are driven by their rationality. I think this is unfair criticism, because any good economist knows people often rely on emotions or they simply make an uninformed choice when it comes to their finances. Solid economic theory takes this into account.

Another important thing to keep in mind is that, as economists, we’re not talking about rationality in the common usage—most people do not really know what economists mean when they talk about “rationality.” They equate the rational choice with the objectively best choice—but that is not what we are talking about in economics. The definition of rationality for economists goes like this: “You are a rational financial market participant if you have preferences that guide your behavior.”

You can see from this that an individual might have a preference that works against his ultimate best interest—for example he may take on less investment risk than he needs to have a good chance of funding an adequate income replacement ratio in retirement—but by our definition this does not mean he is irrational.

I think it is good in general for people to have reasons underlying their economic decisions, but having this element of rationality does not always or even generally mean that an individual will make the right or the best decision based on their objective circumstances. In fact, it can be more challenging to get a rational person on track in the retirement savings effort than it is to get an irrational person on track. If the former has strong psychological biases underlying his reason-driven decisionmaking, it will be hard for a plan sponsor or adviser to push him towards the more appropriate choice.

Q: Can you talk more about how this applies to the daily work of plan sponsors and advisers?

As you know, a lot of the ongoing theoretical work in behavioral finance and retirement plan services more broadly is dedicated to some form of the rationality question—and whether participants should have decisions made for them. This is an area where I am working with a firm called Capital Preferences to really build out a sensible approach for addressing this thinking in the real world of retirement plan administration. For us, the important step for plan sponsors and advisers to take is to try and define how rational their plan participants are, and then to think about what the answer might mean for important plan design decisions.

At Capital Preferences, we are able to deliver this type of an insight because of the careful construction of the "risk and ambiguity” games we use in place of things like portfolio risk questionnaires. In our games, we ask individuals to make a series of theoretical decisions, which are loosely structured like retirement investments. Importantly, we structure the series questions in the game so that, if a person is answering their questions in a rational way and according to a fixed set of principals held in the mind, there should be a pattern in their answers that bears this out.

I’ll give you an example. If you were a rational financial decisionmaker and you told me in one of these games that you preferred a given Portfolio A over another Portfolio B, and then you went on to tell me that you also preferred Portfolio C over Portfolio B, you should not then go on to tell me that you preferred Portfolio C over Portfolio A. When we run a person through a series of these tests like this, we very quickly start to see just how much inconsistency (i.e., irrationality) a given individual displays.

If I’m a financial adviser or a plan sponsor, and I see that you answer all these questions rationally, the question then becomes, does this person’s set of preferences line up with what I believe is their best interest? If so—great—but if not, are there steps I can take from a plan design or educational perspective that will better align one’s preference with one’s best interest?  

If a participant, on the other hand, displays a lot of inconsistency, we have to ask how we can help the individual better understand their own circumstances and their wants and needs. Then we can turn to aligning their rationality and their best interest.

Q: Do you think the movement of this thinking into the financial services mainstream will improve the defined contribution retirement system and lead to more retirement wealth?

There are a few observations we can make that would suggest improving economic rationality will boost retirement plan performance in general. I explain this by first noting that U.S. households with very similar demographic characteristics across metrics like age, location, yearly income and the number of family members—they tend to vary quite widely in terms of their current wealth and their perception of financial well-being or anticipated hardship in retirement.

The question is, then, how can we explain the wealth stratification when these families are working off the same income base and presumably are facing the same expense demands? Outside of academia people are satisfied to say one’s success in wealth accumulation will be determined by the quality of their financial decisions—in the end the people that make higher quality financial decisions will accumulate more wealth. This sounds like a good explanation—but academics like myself, we want to go deeper. What does it actually mean to make financial decisions that are of high quality?

It’s not a concept that is very well defined at present—not least because people have very different goals for how much money they would like to make and how much money they need to be “happy” or “successful.” The key insight we have found after running many of these risk and ambiguity analyses is that, even after we control for income levels and other important factors, our measure of economic rationality helps explain the wealth stratification in a way other factors can’t.  

“The scientific way of saying this: ‘One standard deviation from the mean score of consistency with economic rationality in our experiments is associated with 15% more household wealth.’ In other words, the more consistency one displays in financial decision making, the better off we would expect them to be.”

What Retirement Plan Committees Should Know and Discuss

Retirement plan committees need knowledge and continuing education about a number of key subjects.

The retirement plan committee of an organization needs ongoing support to stay abreast of industry regulations and trends.

About 62% of plan sponsors understand their fiduciary responsibility, says Jordan Burgess, senior vice president, Specialty Field Sales at Fidelity Financial Advisor Solutions. “They understand the basics of participant education and communication,” he tells PLANSPONSOR, “which should be a regular part of what they talk about.”

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Typically, says Bill McClain, senior defined contribution (DC) consultant with Mercer, plan committee members need updates about judicial, regulatory and legislative issues as well as retirement trends. “There’s so much happening in the DC world, it’s difficult for a committee member to keep up with everything going on without support,” he tells PLANSPONSOR.

The regulations that impact DC plans are an important subject to bring before committee members, McClain says. “You need to be able to understand how complex and nuanced regulations apply to the particular situation,” he warns, “and how they have practical grounding,” he says. “How does a regulation apply to the committee members? It requires a high-level skill set—they almost need a legal understanding of how DC plans work in real life.” For help, plan committees often turn to the plan’s adviser, who should be able to answer questions in clear, simple language.

Life stories are the best way to educate plan sponsors or anyone, for that matter, says Jania Stout, practice leader and co-founder of Fiduciary Plan Advisors at HighTower. “Bring to the committee meeting actual cases and walk them through what happened to cause the lawsuit,” she advises.

Stout recommends the committee give their feedback about what the company in each case should have done, with an eye toward the better outcome they would have gotten had they followed more prudent procedures.

NEXT: “Fees take up a lot of meeting time.”

The investments in a plan are another key topic. Burgess suggests that committee members review the investment options on a quarterly basis, at a minimum, and assess how they are performing in line with the investment policy statement (IPS). “Make sure the committee members are well informed about the IPS,” Burgess says. “Although these two may be drier topics, they are well worth it” for the fiduciary weight they carry.

Fee allocation is an important area of committee focus. “There’s been a lot of attention on fee negotiation and benchmarking,” McClain says. “Recordkeeping has become very competitive. Sometimes committees forget about the other side: how you allocate those fees back to participants, which is also a fiduciary decision,” he says. “We’ve been educating committees now as the industry moves away from revenue sharing, they have to address the issue straight on.”

In discussions over fees, committee members will need to examine whether to use a per-account flat fee, fees based on assets, and whether to use an ERISA spending account, which brings up a host of other issues, such as how fees are paid equitably by participants. “Fees take up a lot of meeting time these days,” McClain admits.

Compliance audits can be a key topic, yet McClain says when the topic comes up, committee members often counter that they already have an annual audit.

But they are referring to the plan’s financial audit, not the audit that assesses the plan’s administration and compliance levels. “While it’s true the recordkeeper is charged with administering the plan,” McClain says, “if there is an error in the plan administration or a compliance issue, it comes back to the plan sponsor.” The recordkeeper may have to fulfill some contractual provisions, but if the Department of Labor (DOL) or Internal Revenue Service (IRS) finds issues, they will fine the plan sponsor—not the recordkeeper.

Plan committee members should be acquainted with the potential level of risk: sanctions from audits and the financial risk from corrections can run into the millions of dollars, according to McClain.

NEXT: Ideally, committee members exchange ideas and opinions freely. 

Plan committee members’ backgrounds run the gamut, from finance to HR to legal to those from the corporate side, McClain says. “A well-structured committee should be diverse and provide opportunities for sharing different perspectives.”

The diverse backgrounds means that these disciplines all lend their expertise to the committee, McClain says, and can direct the flow of information—sometimes sub-optimally. “Sometimes you see situations where everybody waits for one person to conduct the committee, and everyone follows that person,” he says.

But ideally committee members will treat one another as sources of important information: A finance person, for instance, who is not as up to speed on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) can hear the opinions and insights of someone in HR. 

McClain notes that when it comes time to select a managed account provider—in many cases, the choice is dependent on the recordkeeper of the plan—the finance person might choose the provider with the lowest cost. The HR person may understand that choosing this provider carries a lot of fiduciary responsibility, because it affects the investment options for participants. The HR person might be more attuned to the sales techniques of the provider.

Different committee members can find topics that play to their professional strengths. “The legal person is going to love the fiduciary audit file and documenting the processes in the plan,” says Steve Bogner, managing director at HighTower Treasury Partners. “The CFO will key in on the economics and performance, but might also be extremely interested in having the strongest possible education program for the participants.”

The ideal committee environment creates an opportunity for people to share and help other committee learn from their peers. “For fiduciary decisions, you want a free exchange of ideas and consensus,” McClain says.

As 401(k)s are increasingly the primary retirement vehicle, McClain points out the greater need for scrutiny, education and diligence by governing committees. “It’s an area more and more people are aware of,” he observes, “as well as their own fiduciary responsibility and risk.”

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