Case Study Warns of Effect of Move From Public DB to Public DC

The NIRS studied the case of Palm Beach, Florida, which it says offers “an important cautionary tale on the detrimental impacts of switching public employees from DB pensions to DC accounts.”

Since 2009, nearly every state modified its retirement systems to ensure long-term sustainability, most often by increasing employee contributions, reducing benefits or both, according to the National Institute on Retirement Security (NIRS).

During these deliberations, some retirement systems faced pressure to move from defined benefit (DB) pension plans to defined contribution (DC) 401(k)-type individual accounts, in part or whole. Advocates of switching from DB to DC plans position the change as reducing employer costs for unfunded liabilities, but the move to DC accounts does nothing to reduce plan liabilities on its own. At the same time, significantly reduced retirement benefits under the DC savings plan create other workforce challenges, such as difficulty in recruiting and retaining public employees, NIRS says.

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The NIRS studied the case of Palm Beach, Florida, which it says offers “an important cautionary tale on the detrimental impacts of switching public employees from DB pensions to DC accounts.” In 2012, the Palm Beach Town Council closed its existing DB pension systems for all employees, including police and fire. Going forward “combined” retirement systems offered police officers and firefighters dramatically lower DB pensions and new individual DC retirement accounts. The move was made because financial markets experienced severe investment losses during 2001 to 2002 and 2008 to 2009. For the DB pensions of Palm Beach, this caused a dramatic increase in the town’s costs for its employee pension funds, which increased by over 600%, from $1.1 million in FY02 to $7.5 million in FY10, the NIRS explains.

According to the NIRS’ report, from the town’s budget perspective, the changes to the pension plan cut costs about 45%. According to a report by the Palm Beach Civic Association, which supported the changes, the pension reforms were anticipated to save taxpayers $6.6 million in 2012, and the annual savings would grow to $10.2 million in 2020. While the Civic Association’s study concluded that employees still would have a meaningful retirement plan, many public safety employees felt differently.

The police union calculated based on the pension reform proposal that the amount of pension income paid to future police officers would be $20,094 compared to the average benefit provided under the existing plan of $56,263.

The NIRS reports that the reaction of existing protective service officers to seeing their pension benefits frozen was swift. Retirements accelerated dramatically. Because the only way younger public safety officers could obtain a better pension was to leave the town’s police and fire departments, those existing employees who did not retire looked for opportunities in nearby local jurisdictions. The town’s two public safety pensions had covered 120 employees at the end of 2011. In addition to the 20% of the town’s workforce that retired after the change, 109 other protective officers left before retirement in the next four years. Mid-career public safety officers departed the forces in unprecedented numbers, with 53 vested police officers and firefighters departing Palm Beach’s forces from 2012 to 2015, compared to just two such experienced employees in the four years from 2008 to 2011.

The town did not anticipate the financial impact of the high attrition. For example, the NIRS firefighters had to work extremely high levels of overtime to fill staffing gaps. Also, the unprecedented loss of new and experienced public safety officers caused the town’s training cost to soar likely reaching upwards of $20 million, based on an “all in” cost estimate of $240,000 per officer to bring a new police officer through the rookie period in Florida.

The Town Council voted in 2016 to abandon the DC plans and improve the DB pensions for police officers and firefighters by raising benefits substantially and lowering the retirement age. The Council offset the cost of the police and fire DB pension improvements by increasing employee contributions and eliminating the DC plan with its employer match.

A previous report from the NIRS showed how three states’ switch from a defined benefit pension to a defined contribution plan exacerbated pension underfunding.

Plaintiffs Win Class Certification in NYU 403(b) Lawsuit

A district court found plaintiffs met the requirements of ERISA Rule 23(a) and the class is maintainable under at least one of the subdivisions of ERISA Rule 23(b).

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled this week to certify a sizable class of plaintiffs in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) lawsuit targeting two 403(b) retirement plans at New York University.

The claims in the case are similar to those filed against many other 403(b) retirement plans run by U.S. universities and colleges large and small. According to the third amended complaint—the one ruled on here—instead of using the NYU plans’ bargaining power to reduce expenses and exercising independent judgment to determine what investments to include in the plans, the defendants squandered that leverage away by allowing the plans’ conflicted third-party service providers—TIAA-CREF and Vanguard—to dictate the plans’ investment lineup, to link their recordkeeping services to the placement of investment products in the plans, and to collect unlimited asset-based compensation from their own proprietary products.

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There are seven named plaintiffs, members of the NYU faculty and research staff, and with this week’s ruling these seven will represent a putative class of at least 20,000 individuals, defined as follows: “All participants and beneficiaries of the NYU School of Medicine Retirement Plan for Members of the Faculty, Professional Research Staff and Administration and the New York University Retirement Plan for Members of the Faculty, Professional Research Staff and Administration from August 9, 2010, through the date of judgment, excluding the defendant and any participant who is a fiduciary to the plans.”

The mechanics of these retirement plans and the participants’ allegations are examined in some depth in prior coverage of the initial filing of the case and the subsequent filing of multiple amended complaints. Considered in more depth in this decision are the requirements of what it takes to establish class certification and standing under ERISA’s strict terms.

As the court lays out, it is merely a “preponderance of evidence” standard against which a plaintiff seeking preliminary certification of a class must prove that its proposed class meets the requirements of ERISA Rule 23(a) and, if those requirements are met, that the class is maintainable under at least one of the subdivisions of ERISA Rule 23(b). Ruling precedence on these matters is given in two previous decisions, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011), and Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc. (2008).

Because the plaintiffs here seek certification under Rule 23(b)(1), they had to prove the following, again merely by the preponderance of the evidence available at this still-early juncture: “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”

Once this is established, Rule 23(b)(1) allows certification if the following condition(s) is also met: “Prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.”

Per the Walmart case, plaintiffs here bear the burden of demonstrating affirmative compliance with the requirements of Rule 23. According to the district court decision, they have done this effectively. Without repeating all the detail available in the text of the decision, the basic conclusion of the court is that the participants amply establish that these 20,000-plus participants are numerous enough to make individual trials an impossibility, and that they are “common” and “typical” enough in their positioning with respect to the relevant questions of fact and law to make common remediation or rejection of the claims a proper outcome.

One quote from this numerosity/commonality/typicality deliberation certainly bears repeating, laying out in quite clear language what is really at stake here: “The core questions in this lawsuit are common to all participants—whether defendant breached its fiduciary duties by taking actions or failing to take actions that resulted in improperly high fees, and whether certain investment options were properly included. In addition, plaintiff has proffered sufficient facts supporting that the discovery at issue in this case will ‘generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.’”

The decision goes into some detail when considering the defendants’ arguments that the plaintiffs here do not “adequately” represent the class they have successfully established.

“NYU and the co-defendants put forth three arguments in support of their assertion that the named plaintiffs are not adequate representatives,” the decision states. “First, NYU argues that plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint proposes a flat-fee payment system for the plans rather than a revenue-sharing system; as a result, the recordkeeper’s compensation would not change due to an increase in assets. Defendant contends that a flat-fee structure would create class conflicts, since members of the class with lower salaries than the named plaintiffs might not benefit from this type of payment structure, as $30 (or some other flat fee) might be more than they would pay in a revenue-sharing arrangement.”

The court is not much convinced: “The Amended Complaint does not simply propose this structure as the preferred outcome. Rather, it alleges that a flat fee structure does ‘not necessarily mean that every participant in the pan must pay the same $30 fee.’ Instead, the fiduciary could implement a ‘proportional asset-based charge,’ for which each participant pays the same percentage of his or her account balance. As such, the suggestion of a flat-fee system as one of several ways to bring the plans into compliance with ERISA does not, in and of itself, create a conflict between the named plaintiffs and other class members, as there are several variations of this system, some of which may not create conflicts. And in any case, this speculation on the part of NYU does not defeat adequacy, as it does not present a ‘fundamental’ conflict, per Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG (2006).”

NYU further argues that removing the CREF Stock and TIAA Real Estate Accounts from the Plans—two accounts that plaintiffs allege were imprudently included in the plans—would create class conflicts because some participants would be hurt by the funds’ removal. However, the court has ruled, “defendant here focuses on the merits of the breach of fiduciary duty claim. It argues: (1) that those funds are important for diversification, as they offer some features that other funds do not; and (2) the CREF Stock and TIAA Real Estate Accounts had strong returns at different points in time, and the variance in performance was beneficial for some participants. That may well be the case, but those arguments go to the merits of the funds’ inclusion in the plans and whether or not they were prudent inclusions. If, in fact, plaintiffs are correct that the inclusion of these funds was a breach of the duty of prudence, then no plan participant would have a legal interest in continuing to invest in a plan that was adjudged imprudent.”

Finally, NYU claims that the named plaintiffs are inadequate representatives because they are unaware of the facts underlying the dispute. For example, NYU relies on deposition testimony to demonstrate that a number of the named plaintiffs do not know what their investments are or how they have performed; what revenue sharing is; and whether NYU attempted to negotiate fees. Instead, the named plaintiffs rely on counsel for information.

The court rules simply on this matter that plaintiffs “are entitled to rely on their counsel for advice.” As long as the class representatives “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,” adequacy is satisfied.

The full text of the decision includes detailed discussion of the plaintiffs’ successful effort to meet the subsequent requirements of ERISA Rule 23(b)(1)—as well as consideration of some important issues of standing and ERISA’s statute of limitations, all of which the plaintiffs have overcome at this early juncture.

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