Cities Do Not Have Relief for Troubled Pensions in All States

In many states there are legislative limits to what municipalities can do to get relief for their troubled pensions, but David Godofsky, with Alston & Bird, describes some options.

Recently, both Dallas and Houston sought and received legislative relief for their troubled pension funds.

David Godofsky, partner in Alston & Bird’s Employee Benefits & Executive Compensation Group, who is based in Washington, D.C., explains that in both cases the cities were allowed to reduce certain future pension benefits and increase employee contributions.

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For example, in Houston, the legislative relief reduced the future cost of living adjustments (COLAs) to pensions. There were different COLAs for different groups of retirees, but those with best were getting 3% per year, not compounded, but based on the original balance at retirement. The COLA is now based on investment returns of the pension fund. According to Godofsky, if a fund has a five-year average return of 5% or less, there is no COLA. If the average return is between 5% and 9%, the COLA is half of the rate of return over 5%, which caps out at 2%. “This is a pretty big reduction if you consider the loss of the compounding effect,” he says.

Also in Houston, they’re requiring active employees to contribute more, using a complicated structure of what certain retirees are contributing. In Dallas, they are asking active employees to contribute more, and future benefits for people who retire have been reduced.

These kinds of reforms would be illegal in some states, Godofsky notes. The rules are different in various states; many have detailed pension protections in state constitutions, and say specifically that pension benefits will be protected. These states include Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, New York and Texas.

He explains that these protections vary from state to state. In some states, once you hire an employee, you cannot change the pension benefit adversely even for those pensions not yet accrued. In some states, there might be protections for benefits earned but not for those yet to be reaped, and in others, there are protections for benefits earned and for those employees eligible to retire. Texas has limited protections; they only apply to certain municipal plans and some cities are exempt.

NEXT: Contract clauses can limit what municipal pensions can do

According to Godofsky, all states have contract clauses in their constitutions similar to that in the U.S. Constitution. It says something like, “Legislation cannot impair provisions of contracts.” Some courts say that contract laws apply to public pensions—Florida, Arkansas and California are examples.

He says in each of these states, the state Supreme Court has prescribed protections somewhat differently. In Florida, there is no pension protection clause, but the statute says pensions are in the nature of contractual provisions. The Florida Supreme Court held that the protection only extends to benefits already earned or accrued, not to those to be accumulated in the future.

In Illinois, municipalities generally cannot change pensions at all in any adverse way, but they can use traditional contract rules. For example, Godofsky says, employees could agree to lower pensions. “That doesn’t usually happen, but unions do negotiate changes in pensions, so unions are allowed to negotiate with employers to reduce pension benefits,” he notes.

Cities need to look at the specifics of pension reform legislation in each state.

“A lot of states’ and municipalities’ budgets are under pressure because underfunded pension obligations in the past have built up and they don’t have money now to shore up pensions. They are having to pay pension benefits out of current revenue. As pension funding gets built up, they have to divert money to pay for police, schools, medical care and pensions for people who no longer work for government,” Godofsky says.

He adds that states and municipalities can only do so much to increase taxes. Voters revolt and businesses leave, so they end up collecting less in taxes. In some cases, they are only willing to increase taxes at a limited level.

NEXT: So what can municipalities do?

In terms of alternatives, Godofsky notes that first of all, there are plenty of states in which municipalities can do whatever.

But, focusing on states with limitations, it is possible to make changes if there is a union involved. Getting buy-ins from unions is very helpful.

In some states, another option is to go the contractual route. For example, according to Godofsky, the employer may say, “We are going to require large contributions to the pension fund unless you individually agree to accept this new pension formula.” He says the more traditional route has been to grandfather people who have been around and change pension benefits for new employees or employees with fewer years of service, but a lot of municipalities have so many retirees now, they need to address funding from current workers.

Godofsky adds that there has been some movement to increase retirement ages. There are some municipalities in which employees can retire at a young age—after 20 years of service, for example. “There is a lot of push now to increase retirement ages. That was a factor for the Texas cities; many municipalities have a retirement age of 50 or 55, in Houston, it was 50. Those are being pushed up generally,” he says.

“Generally speaking, more buy-in from unions and employees can introduce choice, and municipalities will be more likely to survive challenges in jurisdictions in which they are limited on what they are allowed to do,” Godofsky concludes.

Stock-Drop Lawsuit Alleges Disclosure Failures

Plaintiffs attempt in their complaint to establish that fraud was at least potentially occurring, and that this should have been enough to prevent plan fiduciaries from continuing to offer employer stock to participants.

A new class action challenge filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Giantonio vs. Chicago Bridge & Iron, accuses plan fiduciaries of improperly continuing to offer employer stock as an investment option in the company’s retirement plan while the company faced serious financial challenges.   

Similar to other stock-drop challenges, this Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) lawsuit alleges the employer knew its stock price was artificially inflated during the class period—October 29, 2013, through the present—making it an imprudent retirement investment for the plans. 

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As the text of the lawsuit spells out, “Defendants knew or should have known that material facts about CB&I’s business had not been disclosed to the market, causing CB&I Stock to trade at prices above which it would have traded had such facts been disclosed.”

As a rule these claims are hard to prove in court, it should be stated, because even though the famous Supreme Court decision in Fifth-Third vs. Dudenhoeffer established that plan sponsors offering employer stock cannot rely on a blanket presumption of prudence, nevertheless the assertion that plan fiduciaries should have determined that the public stock price of their company was inflated (or indeed undervalued) is generally implausible—absent special circumstances such as massive willful fraud.

Knowing this, the plaintiffs attempt in their complaint to establish that fraud was at least potentially occurring, and that this should have been enough to prevent plan fiduciaries from continuing to offer employer stock to participants. As the complaint states: “During the class period, the company failed to disclose that it was responsible for hundreds of millions of dollars in liability and had improperly accounted for its goodwill during 2013 to cover losses associated with construction delays and cost overruns on contracts to complete construction of new nuclear power plants in Waynesboro, Georgia and Jenkinsville, South Carolina (the “Nuclear Projects”). Furthermore, the company faces potential fraud claims valued at over $2 billion, which exceeds its market capitalization as of the filing of this complaint.”

Given the totality of circumstances prevailing during the class period, plaintiffs assert that “no prudent fiduciary could have made the same decision as made by defendants here to retain and/or continue purchasing the clearly imprudent CB&I Stock as investment in the plans.”

NEXT: Details from the text of the suit 

Attempting to establish that plan fiduciaries should have known their employer’s stock price was inflated, and to established alternative actions the fiduciaries should have known to take, the text of the lawsuit offers extensive background on the recent development of the Chicago Bridge & Iron company, particularly the acquisition of Shaw Group Inc. and the company’s effort to serve contracts related to the nuclear power industry. The background info shows that eventually Chicago Bridge & Iron entered into a merger agreement with Westinghouse, which plaintiffs say partially contributed to that company’s own eventual bankruptcy.

As of June 5, 2017, CB&I’s stock was down 40.8% over the prior three months and 40.2% over the prior six months. The stock has returned -49.7% over the last year, plaintiffs claim, and the company’s market capitalization is less than its potential liabilities as of the filing of the complaint.

The complaint continues: “Disclosure might not have prevented the plans from taking an inevitable loss on company stock it already held, but it would have prevented the plans from acquiring (through participants’ uninformed investment decisions and continued investment of matching contributions) additional shares of artificially inflated company stock. The longer the concealment continued, the more of the plans’ good money went into a bad investment; full disclosure would have cut short the period in which the plans bought company stock at inflated prices.”

A number of alternative actions are proposed: “Defendants should have closed the company stock fund to further contributions and directed that contributions be diverted from company stock into prudent investment options based upon the participants’ instructions or, if there were no such instructions, the plans’ default investment option … Neither of these actions would have implicated, let alone been in violation of, federal securities laws or any other laws. Nor would the plans ceasing to purchase additional company stock likely send a negative signal to the market.”

Alternatively, plaintiffs allege, “defendants could have disclosed (or caused others to disclose) CB&I’s construction delays and cost overruns on contracts to complete construction of the nuclear projects so that CB&I Stock would trade at a fair value … Given the relatively small number of shares of CB&I stock purchased by the plans when compared to the market float of CB&I Stock, it is extremely unlikely that this decrease in the number of shares that would have been purchased, considered alone, would have had an appreciable impact on the price of CB&I Stock.”

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