Plan Sponsors Are Getting No Answers From Excessive Fee Lawsuits

Excessive fee lawsuit activity has ramped up with no major decisions by the courts; however, a pending decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in one case could impact the amount of activity going forward.

Recently, defendants in a lawsuit against the University of Miami agreed to a $1.85 million settlement.

The lawsuit alleged the defendants violated their Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) fiduciary duties by allowing plan participants to pay excessive fees for investments and recordkeeping and by selecting poorly performing funds. Meanwhile, a new lawsuit has been filed against Advance Stores Co., the parent company of Advance Auto Parts, with similar allegations.

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In addition, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has rejected an amicus brief filed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in an ERISA excessive fee lawsuit against the American National Red Cross. The brief said the rapid increase in excessive fee litigation is not “a warning that retirees’ savings are in jeopardy,” but proof that converting “subpar allegations” into settlements has proven to be a lucrative endeavor for attorneys bringing the lawsuits. The chamber pointed out that the increase in litigation has led to an increase in the cost of fiduciary liability insurance and made it more difficult to procure such insurance. It argued that this increased cost could lead large plan sponsors to make less generous employer contributions to their plans, and it could make employer contributions cost-prohibitive for small employers, adding that this goes against ERISA’s intent to encourage the offering of retirement plans to employees.

Judge Emmet G. Sullivan noted that leave to file an amicus curiae brief should be denied unless a party in the suit is not represented or not represented competently or unless “the amicus has unique information or perspective that can help the court beyond the help that the lawyers for the parties are able to provide.” He found that the chamber has “not shown that a party is not adequately represented,” and that “several of movant’s arguments are duplicative of those in the defendants’ motion to dismiss.”

In short, there is a great deal of activity when it comes to ERISA excessive fee lawsuits, but very few answers. The University of Miami joins a number of plan sponsors that have decided to settle lawsuits against them, and very few lawsuits have been dismissed.

The few cases that have gone to trial have largely involved more unique situations such as proprietary funds, questions about conflicts of interest or prohibited transaction issues, notes Emily Costin, a partner at Alston & Bird in Washington, D.C. She says the bulk of lawsuits involve more run-of-the-mill claims that fees are too high or investments are underperforming in single-employer plans.

According to Costin, more than 50% of lawsuits are making it past motions to dismiss. Then it becomes a choice for the plan sponsor to either continue to litigation, which becomes expensive for a claim that might only involve a couple of a million dollars, or settle the lawsuit because it’s not worth the expense. “For many of the lawsuits, the relief wouldn’t amount to much money, but plan sponsors also don’t want to spend the time and effort continuing to fight,” she says. She adds that the input from insurance carriers is a consideration in whether a case settles.

One thing industry watchers can glean from the settlements being made is there is a trend that, basically, if a suit has survived motions to dismiss, it will end up getting settled, says Ari Sonneberg, a partner at The Wagner Law Group in Boston.

Some of the settlements are monetary only, but some have included nonmonetary conditions, such as an agreement that the plan sponsor will hire an independent investment manager to select and monitor investments or that it will issue a request for proposals (RFP) for a new recordkeeper.

Costin says, often, the nonmonetary considerations are agreed to in order to bridge a gap. “Plan sponsors are saying there’s no more money to be given but they’ll agree to certain action so counsel will feel they’ve gotten a good deal for participants—a value to participants that is nonmonetary,” she says. “I wouldn’t read too much into [nonmonetary conditions].”

Whether a settlement includes nonmonetary conditions speaks to the type of plaintiff and/or attorney and whether those parties really care about what happens in the future for the plan and want to see changes, Sonneberg says. “Ostensibly, a large settlement will have that effect anyway because a plan sponsor will change its practices to avoid facing another lawsuit,” he adds.

Costin says comparing settlement terms is really an apples-to-oranges comparison. “We can’t look at a dollar figure and determine whether plan fiduciaries acted badly and how badly,” she says, noting that settlement amounts and conditions can be determined by different claims, the size of the plan, a certain judge or jurisdiction, or how much the plan sponsor has already spent on the case.

So far, the only takeaway from excessive fee lawsuits for plan sponsors is that having a good process is key, Costin says. She adds that there’s no guarantee of preventing a lawsuit from being filed, noting that one lawsuit might challenge a certain type of issue while another might claim just the opposite.

“A plan sponsor can do everything right and still be a target. Anyone can get sued,” she says. “So having a good process and documentation in place is the best defense.”

However, Costin says she thinks a wave is coming where plan sponsors might stick out the litigation process because they don’t think they did anything wrong. “I wouldn’t be surprised if some companies soon put their foot down,” she says. “Everyone wants someone else to do it first, though.”  

Is Any Relief in Sight for Plan Sponsors?

One excessive fee case, Hughes v. Northwestern University, has made it to the U.S. Supreme Court. The court heard arguments on whether participants in a defined contribution (DC) ERISA plan stated a plausible claim for relief against plan fiduciaries for breach of the duty of prudence by alleging that the fiduciaries caused the participants to pay investment management or administrative fees higher than those available for other materially identical investment products or services.

Sonneberg says the fact that so many lawsuits are being settled is a reason the Northwestern case is important.

“If, by overturning the 7th Circuit’s decision, it lowers the threshold for a case to be heard, we will see more suits and settlements,” he says. “If the court says the 7th Circuit got it right, and that plaintiffs making excessive fee claims must show, beyond the fact that fees were high, that a fiduciary breach occurred in order for their suit to get into court, we will see fewer cases and more dismissals rather than settlements.”

Sonneberg adds that in the few cases where a lawsuit has been dismissed, the lower courts have indicated that it is not enough to say fees were excessive; plaintiffs have to demonstrate in their pleadings that plan fiduciaries’ behavior in choosing expensive plan investment options was a breach of ERISA.

“There’s a big difference in those claims,” he says. “It’s easy to compare what fees a plan is paying to what other plans of the same size are paying or to compare what a plan’s provider charges to what other providers charge for the same services. If that’s all plaintiffs’ attorneys had to do, that would be an easy win, but if they have to demonstrate how fiduciaries were acting in breach of ERISA, that’s certainly more of an uphill battle and harder to win.”

Sonneberg says from what he’s heard about the oral arguments in the Northwestern case, the Supreme Court might be of that notion too.

Defendants in some excessive fee lawsuits have argued that their plans offer investments that have higher fees as well as those with lower fees, and some investments in their plan’s lineup have underperformed while others have performed well. They say participants make the choice of what they invest in. Sonneberg says Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan homed in on this issue, asking whether it’s OK to turn a blind eye to poor investment options so long as there are good ones for participants to choose from as well. She indicated that the Supreme Court’s answer to this question is important.

“If a precedent is established that having good options doesn’t offset the fact there are some bad apples, then plaintiffs are more likely to succeed in these cases, and vice versa,” Sonneberg says.

Costin says she thinks it’s unlikely an opinion from the Supreme Court will put an end to the lawsuit tsunami. “There seemed to be enough consensus in the room that an allegation that the plan sponsor should have used a cheaper share class for investments is possibly a plausible claim if it is pleaded correctly, for example,” Costin says. “I think the Supreme Court’s decision might give plaintiffs a road map of how to plead those types of claims.”

Costin also notes that some of the claims the high court is reviewing are more specific to university 403(b) cases and don’t apply to 401(k)s. For example, the Northwestern lawsuit claimed that the use of multiple recordkeepers—a practice that has traditionally been common for 403(b) plans—resulted in excessive fees being charged to plan participants.

“I didn’t pick up from the discussion that 403(b) plans should be treated differently than 401(k)s, but I did get the idea that the justices thought that if fees could be lowered by consolidating providers, the plaintiffs had made a plausible claim,” Costin says.

Sonneberg says he thinks it might be a tacit understanding that 403(b) plans are viewed differently than 401(k) plans. ERISA doesn’t differentiate between the fiduciary duties for each plan type, but their differences could be considered in litigation because facts and circumstances are part of the analysis as to whether a fiduciary is being prudent, he says.

Costin says she does hope the retirement plan industry gets more guidance from the court on the prudence standard in general. Costin says Chief Justice John Roberts spoke about whether it’s OK for a plan to be average and that it’s not realistic to require plan fiduciaries to get the best possible result all the time. “If the court’s opinion elaborates on that, it could trickle down to some of these claims,” she says. “But I don’t see an opinion coming down that will completely shut down these cases.”

Costin says the justices also discussed how these lawsuits might hurt the retirement plan market. Justice Brett Kavanaugh touched on what the wave of litigation has done to the fiduciary insurance market, she notes, as well as the fact that individuals have been targeted as defendants in the lawsuits. She says that individual targeting could lead to some people no longer wanting to be fiduciaries.

Noting that some of the lawsuits have claimed that changes plan sponsors have made are evidence that they were doing something wrong before the change, Costin says she hopes the court shuts down the notion that a change supports a claim that fiduciaries breached their fiduciary duties.

“The Supreme Court’s decision in the Northwestern case will probably be very determinative of the number of excessive fee suits we see in the future,” Sonneberg says.

The court is expected to issue a decision by June.

Review of Oral Arguments in Northwestern University ERISA Case

Two attorneys say things so far look good for Northwestern University, meaning the court could raise pleading standards for plaintiffs in excessive fee lawsuits.

This week, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) excessive fee lawsuit known as Hughes v. Northwestern University.

The question before the high court is whether participants in a defined contribution (DC) ERISA plan stated a plausible claim for relief against plan fiduciaries for breach of the duty of prudence by alleging that the fiduciaries caused the participants to pay investment management and administrative fees higher than those available for other materially identical investment products or services.

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Prior to the Supreme Court agreeing to take up the case, U.S. federal government attorneys asked the Supreme Court to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari requested by participants of two Northwestern University 403(b) retirement plans. A writ of certiorari is a request that the Supreme Court order a lower court to send up the record of the case for review. In their writ, the attorneys said the plaintiffs state at least two plausible claims for breach of ERISA’s duty of prudence. They argued the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in favor of the university is incorrect and conflicts with decisions made by the 3rd and 8th Circuits in similar cases.

Following the oral arguments, PLANSPONSOR engaged in the following Q&A discussion with a pair of expert ERISA attorneys from the law firm Mayer Brown. The attorneys are Nancy Ross, a Chicago-based partner and co-chair of the firm’s ERISA litigation practice, and Jed Glickstein, Chicago-based counsel in the firm’s litigation and dispute resolution practice. The pair had submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in the case, calling on the high court to answer—in favor of Northwestern University and in support of the 7th Circuit ruling—the question of what qualifies as a plausible claim for relief in DC plan excessive investment and recordkeeping fee suits.

In sum, the pair say the questions and argumentations coming from the bench showed a preference for the position of Northwestern University, such that the pair would “rather be in their shoes than the plaintiffs’ shoes.” However, they warned that the Supreme Court could still certainly rule in a surprising or unexpected way, and it has the leeway to either publish a sweeping or a highly limited ruling, so caution and patience are warranted. They expect a ruling to be filed by late Spring 2022, but even that timing is uncertain at this juncture.

PLANSPONSOR: Can you please remind our readers what is at stake in this case and why some parties have suggested it could result in a Supreme Court decision that sets important precedents that could shape the future of retirement plan excessive fee lawsuits?

Ross: I think the best place to start is by making the point that some attorneys, myself included, felt this was an interesting and frankly surprising case for the Supreme Court to agree to review—this one out of the hundreds of excessive fee cases that have been filed across the United States.

Why do I say that? It is because the justices have latched onto a case that, on its face, involves a pretty narrow, niche type of defined contribution plan—a 403(b) plan run in ways that are unique to higher education institutions. The investment options that are the central feature in the case are TIAA annuities of a type that are more or less unique to higher education institutions and which do not commonly appear in the typical corporate 401(k) plan.

So, the question is, how broad is the opinion going to be? Will it really provide useful instruction and guidance to corporate 401(k) plan fiduciaries, as opposed to just these university-type plans? The answer could be yes, certainly, and we could get a ruling that provides guidelines and instructions to all types of DC plans regarding the pleading standards that would-be plaintiffs must meet in future excessive fee cases, but it is also possible that the ruling will be more limited.

Glickstein: I agree, but I also think the Supreme Court, given its limited time and resources, likely would not have taken up this case if it was just going to make a ruling on the pleading standards that only apply to these plans—this specific type of university-operated 403(b) plan. My expectation is that they are likely going to say something about the pleading standards under ERISA as a broader and more general matter.

Now, on the question of why the Supreme Court chose this case, I think one answer is that it is representative of the very cookie-cutter nature of many of these excessive fee lawsuits. The cases that have been filed against Northwestern University and other big-name schools are remarkably similar—they are true cookie-cutter cases. This is meaningful because we have a real circuit split in these cases, with different lower courts reaching different conclusions on what are in essence the exact same pleadings. So, that’s an interesting dynamic playing out here and it opens up a lane for a potentially sweeping decision.

Ross: Good point. We have a very defined group of targeted defendants here—the 20 or so educational institutions fighting ERISA cases that all look so similar. It is probably fair to say that, if there had been a similar number of cookie-cutter lawsuits against a different industry or sector, we very well might have seen a different case elevated to the Supreme Court.

I believe another factor involved is the fact that the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals is very well respected, and it is a circuit in which rulings have been filed based on the determination that ERISA retirement plan fiduciaries should not be overly paternalistic.

PLANSPONSOR: Regarding the potential outcome of the case, did you get a clear sense of where some or all of the justices seem to be settling on the important question underpinning the lawsuit?

Glickstein: I felt cautiously optimistic, based on the tenor of the questions, that this ruling will come down in favor of the Northwestern University defendants, meaning it will in some way raise and strengthen the pleading standards over which plaintiffs must jump in order to state a plausible claim for relief under ERISA.

It seems to me that the justices understand the broader context here—that is, they appreciate the immense settlement pressures that have come to be in the ERISA litigation landscape. They seem to appreciate the fact that plaintiffs’ attorneys now see getting past the motion to dismiss stage as the real goal of their efforts, thereby wining settlements from defendants who don’t want to engage in potentially costly and lengthy litigation. The justices were all engaged in the question of how they could help to ensure that frivolous lawsuits are not allowed to proceed while also ensuring meritorious claims have an adequate path forward. Of course, that’s a very difficult question to answer in practice.

Ross: That is my sense as well. I will note that I have already had a number of calls from plan sponsors asking whether or not they should make changes to their plan lineup or plan administration in light of how the oral arguments went. Really it is too early to do so, because even a decision that is held in favor of Northwestern University could be structured in so many different potential ways. Many of my colleagues in the defense bar think the 7th Circuit’s decision will be affirmed.

Another interesting point to make is that Northwestern University is a very sympathetic defendant. There is a perception, and I think an accurate one, that U.S. universities are much more democratic and horizontal in their leadership and management structures. This is very different from the hierarchies and leadership styles that you tend to have in corporate America.

Jed and I were happy to hear that one of the justices picked up on a point we made in our amicus brief, where we noted that these cases don’t just target large institutions or companies—they directly target individuals. I think the justices appreciated our point that, for ERISA fiduciaries operating plans in this litigious environment, no good deed goes unpunished.

PLANSPONSOR: Any thoughts about how the current structure of the court, with its substantial conservative majority, might impact the outcome?

Glickstein: You know, in this case, as in other ERISA cases before, the questions and arguments coming from the justices did not seem to break down cleanly on liberal versus conservative lines. My view is that all of the justices were grappling with the exact question we all have posed: How do we get rid of frivolous cases while also allowing meritorious cases to proceed? All of them in their own way were coming to this key, central question. That’s the core of the case, and I think the majority of the justices feel the balance is out of whack today. Again, I would rather be the defendant than the plaintiff, at this point.

Ross: Yes, but I would like to add that I thought the arguments and questions from the justices, in some regards, were misdirected, as there was less direct discussion of the pleading standard itself than I would have liked to hear. There were far more questions being asked that went straight into the merits of this particular case, and there was virtually no discussion of ERISA’s actual statutory intent or language. This makes me wonder whether we aren’t in store for a fairly narrow decision that ultimately does not give fiduciaries much comfort or guidance, even if the 7th Circuit ruling is upheld.

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