Market Returns Help Boost Institutional Investor Returns

“This quarter’s return boosted the one-year return to 10.49% for the year ending March 31, 2017,” says Robert J. Waid, managing director, Wilshire Associates.

Institutional assets tracked by the Wilshire Trust Universe Comparison Service (Wilshire TUCS) saw a median return of 4.02% for all plan types in the first quarter and a median one-year gain of 10.49%.

Public funds posted a quarterly return of 4.10%, while foundations and endowments posted a quarterly return of 4.38%. Corporate funds’ and Taft Hartley defined benefit plans’ quarterly returns were each 3.81%, and Taft Hartley health and welfare funds posted a 2.52% quarterly return. Wilshire explains that Taft Hartley defined benefit plans, Taft Hartley health and welfare funds, and corporate funds experienced median returns worse than the 60/40 portfolio, which pulled the median return for all plan types down.

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“This quarter marked the sixth consecutive positive quarter, which is the longest string of positive quarterly returns for all plan types since June 1998, which marked a string of 14 positive quarters in a row. Not only was this the sixth positive quarter in a row for all plan types, but it was the best quarter since the fourth quarter of 2013, which saw a median return of 4.81%,” says Robert J. Waid, managing director, Wilshire Associates. “This quarter’s return boosted the one-year return to 10.49% for the year ending March 31, 2017, compared to 7.24% for the year ending December 31, 2016.”

Wilshire TUCS returns were supported by strong performance across all major asset classes. The Wilshire 5000 Total Market Index returned 5.61% for the first quarter and 18.35% for the year ending March 31, 2017, while the MSCI AC World ex U.S. (Net) for international equities rose 7.86% in the first quarter and 13.13% for the year. The Wilshire Bond Index also gained 1.27% in the first quarter and 2.92% for the year.

In the first quarter and for the year ending March 31, 2017, larger public funds and foundations and endowments outperformed smaller public funds and foundations and endowments. Large foundations and endowments continued to have significant exposure to alternatives as the median exposure rose to 40.34% in the first quarter.

All plan types with assets greater than $1 billion experienced median returns of 4.16% for the first quarter and 11.04% for the year ending March 31, 2017, compared to plans with assets less than $1 billion, which experienced median returns of 3.98% for the first quarter and 9.93% for the year.

Barry’s Pickings Online: A Default Payout Solution

Michael Barry, president of the Plan Advisory Services Group, discusses the fundamental principles of the 401(k) system, defaults and plan leakage.

PS-Portrait-Article-Barry-JCiardiello.jpgArt by J.CiardielloOne of the things we are learning, as we strive to understand what “retirement policy” looks like in the 21st century, is that not everyone’s retirement income needs and capacities are the same. A variety of factors—different for every worker—affect that calculation.

Consider “family.” A worker/couple who has children will, on the one hand, have competing demands for available income—education and child raising expenses versus retirement savings—limiting her/their capacity to save. The USDA estimates the cost of raising one child at $233,610. That will put a strain on anyone’s ability to save, say, 10% to 15% of income for retirement. Think about what that strain is if you’re raising three or four children. On the other hand, even in an age in which personal autonomy is one of our highest values, the existence of family—and, particularly, working children—can provide a vital Plan B: in the worst case, you can move in with your kids. Lots of people do it. Obviously, workers/savers without children/family don’t have child-raising costs, but they also don’t have that emergency Plan B. They really need to save.

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Also, some workers may have more outside resources than others: e.g., some people own their own homes; some don’t. Some workers have more flexibility than others: some people may, at retirement, be able to move to a low-cost of living community, dramatically reducing their income needs. For others, that is not an option. Some workers may have health issues that affect what they will need in retirement—on the one hand, (perhaps) larger health expenses, on the other (perhaps) a shortened life expectancy.

And, finally, some humans may simply have different views of time and life. Some may value time in their younger years more than time in their older years. I realize this notion is a controversial: conventional wisdom is that humans “hyperbolically discount” future values. But even accepting that theory, there is room for differing preferences. If you really like mountain climbing, you’re probably going to want to do it while you’re younger. For others, the goal of total financial independence and (perhaps) an early retirement is a more important value.

One of the features of 401(k) plans is that they allow different workers to make different choices about saving (and spending) levels. One worker can save a lot. Another can save nothing. This flexibility is one of the two major reasons why 401(k) plans have, for most sponsors and workers, replaced defined benefit plans, with their rigid, one size fits all design. (The other major reason is 401(k) plans’ greater transparency.)

Nevertheless, the consensus—with which I agree—is that humans have a natural bias towards spending rather than saving and thus should be encouraged to save. I’m prepared to accept some level of coercion to achieve that goal—e.g., the current levels of Social Security taxation/benefits. Beyond that, I favor non-coercive encouragement, the most effective and efficient version of which is (again, in my opinion) a “nudge”—defaulting individuals into some rough version of adequate savings, allowing those with a strong preference for a different (and conceivably lower) savings rate to affirmatively elect out of the default.

NEXT: 401(k) plan flexibility and “leakage”

And so we come to the issue of “leakage.” I find this term problematic because it covers two very different issues that (I think) should be addressed in opposite ways. Generally, retirement savings “leakage” is understood to include (1) loans, (2) hardship withdrawals and (3) cashouts at termination of employment. Loans and hardship withdrawals are, I believe, a 401(k) plan feature, not a bug. They are part of the flexibility these plans provide, allowing cash-strained participants to take a risk on making plan contributions, knowing that if they need to access their savings they can get it.

Cashouts are another matter. They are, in effect, a “loophole” in our system of defaults. We default workers into saving (via automatic enrollment), but we don’t default them into leaving their savings in the plan when they terminate. That is actually a huge problem. As the Employee Benefit Research Institute has shown, “cashouts at job change have a much more serious impact on 401(k) savings than either plan loan defaults or hardship withdrawals. … 20% of those in the lowest-income quartile who would otherwise have enough savings to achieve a real replacement rate threshold of 80% would fall short due to these cashouts at job change.”

Efforts to address this issue, e.g., by encouraging sponsors to allow terminating employees to leave their money in their “old” employer’s plan and/or the development of a clearinghouse that can be used to implement a money-follows-the-employee regime, represent one of the most important retirement policy initiatives confronting us at this time. And, I would add a rule that mandated default to one of those two alternatives—money-stays-in-the-plan or money-follows-the-employee.

I spent all that space, at the beginning of this article, discussing the importance of flexibility in the 401(k) system, to demonstrate the importance to that system of choice within a context that encourages responsible retirement savings. We have learned—from 40 years of experience—that defaults do the best job of respecting both of those principles.

 

Thus we have made—through the use of defaults—a lot of progress towards getting employees to save enough (via automatic enrollment) and to invest their savings efficiently (through default investment in target-date funds). We need a robust default solution at payout.

 

Michael Barry is president of the Plan Advisory Services Group, a consulting group that helps financial services­ corporations with the regulatory issues facing their plan sponsor clients. He has 40 years’ experience in the benefits field, in law and consulting firms, and blogs regularly http://moneyvstime.com/ about retirement plan and policy issues.    

This feature is to provide general information only, does not constitute legal or tax advice, and cannot be used or substituted for legal or tax advice. Any opinions of the author do not necessarily reflect the stance of Asset International or its affiliates.

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