Prospect Chartercare Faces Lawsuit Over DB Plan Funding

The complaint alleges that at a certain point, the plan lost its church plan status as defined by ERISA and was required to adhere to ERISA funding rules.

A newly filed challenge to a health care system’s retirement plan church plan status claims the plan at some point failed to be a church plan, and entities administering or associated with the plan hid this to keep from adhering to funding rules as defined by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).

Plaintiff Stephen Del Soto filed the lawsuit on behalf of the plan and its participants, in his capacity as Receiver for and Administrator of the Plan, appointed by the Rhode Island Superior Court.

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Named as defendants in the suit are Prospect Chartercare, a limited liability company, which directly and through its 100%-owned subsidiaries owns and operates health care facilities in Rhode Island, including but not limited to two hospitals, Roger Williams Hospital and Our Lady of Fatima Hospital, having acquired them in connection with an asset sale that closed on June 20, 2014.

Also named are Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware; St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode Island (SJHSRI), which prior to the 2014 asset sale, owned Fatima Hospital; and Roger Williams Hospital (RWH), the survivor of a merger in 2010 with Roger Williams Medical Center, sometimes doing business under that name.

According to the complaint, since the 2014 asset sale, SJHSRI no longer operates a hospital or otherwise provides health care. Instead, SJHSRI’s business consists of defending lawsuits and workers’ compensation claims, collecting certain debts and receivables, paying or settling certain liabilities which were excluded from the 2014 asset sale, and, until the Receiver was appointed, administering the plan. The same is true of the business of RWH.

Also named as defendants are Prospect Chartercare St. Joseph, which has owned Fatima Hospital since the 2014 asset sale; Rhode Island Community Foundation, which holds and invests funds on behalf of CC Foundation to which the plaintiffs claim to be entitled, and is named in the suit solely as a stakeholder of property claimed by the plaintiffs, so that they may be accorded complete relief; the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, a corporation sole, created by an act of the Rhode Island General Assembly; Diocesan Administration Corporation, which aids in administering the affairs of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Providence; Bishop Tobin, president and chief executive officer of Diocesan Administration; Diocesan Service Corporation; which aids in administering the affairs of and services provided by the Diocese of Providence; and The Angell Pension Group, Inc., which provided actuarial services in connection with the plan, and, at least since 2011, provided administrative services which included dealing directly with and advising plan participants, initially on behalf of and as agents for SJHSRI and CCCB, and later on behalf of and as agents for SJHSRI, CCCB, and the Prospect entities.

The case concerns an insolvent defined benefit (DB) retirement plan, The St. Joseph Health Services of Rhode Island Retirement Plan, with more than 2,700 participants. The participants learned in August of 2017 that the plan had not been adequately funded. The disclosure occurred when the plan was placed into receivership by SJHSRI, with the request that the Rhode Island Superior Court approve a virtually immediate 40% across-the-board reduction in benefits.

The complaint says that for nearly 50 years, SJHSRI promised employees and prospective employees that SJHSRI made 100% of the necessary contributions and that they had no investment risk, leading employees and prospects to “mistakenly but justifiably” conclude that SJHSRI was making the necessary contributions and their pensions were safe. However, the lawsuit says for most of at least the past 10 years, SJHSRI stopped making necessary contributions with the result that the plan was grossly underfunded, and it alleges that SJHSRI and other defendants conspired to conceal it from plan participants through fraudulent misrepresentations and material omissions regarding the Plan;

According to the complaint, SJHSRI, the Prospect entities, and other defendants violated ERISA, committed fraud, breached their contractual obligations, violated their duty of good faith and fair dealing, and otherwise acted wrongfully. The lawsuit asks that they must be required to compensate losses to the plan and remedy such violations, including returning all assets improperly diverted from the plan, and to otherwise fully fund the plan.

Loss of church plan status

In 1984, the predecessor to the plan, which at the time was considered a church plan, elected not to be covered under ERISA, but this was not disclosed to plan participants. At various times during the period from 1995 to the present, SJHSRI did not fund the plan in accordance with the requirements of ERISA and the recommendations of the plan’s actuaries, with the result that the plan is grossly underfunded, the complaint says.

The plaintiffs argue that there came a time when the plan no longer qualified as a church plan under ERISA, but SJHSRI, RWH, CCCB, Angell, the Prospect entities, and the Diocesan defendants all fraudulently conspired to misrepresent that the plan remained qualified as a church plan, in violation of federal tax laws and ERISA.

According to the complaint, at various times since 2009, the plan did not qualify as a church plan because it was not maintained by a qualifying “principal-purpose” organization as defined in ERISA, and it did not qualify as a church plan because SJHSRI was no longer “controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or association of churches,” according to the ERISA definition. In addition, the lawsuit alleges that “at various times since 2009, and certainly after the 2014 Asset Sale and the Plan being put into receivership in August of 2017, the Plan did not qualify as a Church Plan because SJHSRI was no longer entitled to tax exempt status under the group exemption issued tothe United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, and therefore was no longer properly included in the Catholic Directory because it was no longer “operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with the Roman Catholic Church in the United States.”

In 2013, Bishop Tobin issued a resolution ratifying a 2011amendment of the plan, which confirmed that SJHSRI’s Board of Trustees was the Retirement Board. The Board of Trustees was primarily responsible for direction of all of the activities of SJHSRI, including the operation of Old Fatima Hospital, and, therefore, was not a principal-purpose organization. Moreover, the Board of Trustees delegated administration of the plan to the “wholly-secular” CCCB Finance Committee, which directed financial matters for CCCB, including management of Old Fatima Hospital and Old Roger Williams Hospital, and, therefore, was not controlled by or associated with any church, and was not a principal-purpose organization.

After the closing of the 2014 asset sale, the lawsuit noted, the Board of Trustees and the CCCB Finance Committee ceased any administration of the plan. By resolution dated December 15, 2014, CCCB caused SJHSRI to delegate “the administration, management and potential wind-down” of the plan to SJHSRI’s president and to one of SJHSRI’s attorneys, “each acting alone.” Neither of these individuals was an organization, much less a principal-purpose organization, or associated with a church.

Social Investing and ERISA Plans: The Context Is Significant

Thomas White, partner at Rimon Law, discusses how plan sponsors should consider ESG investments following the DOL’s latest guidance.

The Department of Labor (DOL) recently issued Field Assistance Bulletin (FAB) 2018-01. This guidance is intended to explain how much importance the fiduciaries of Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)-covered retirement plans, when selecting investments for those plans, may or should ascribe to investments that promote social policy goals. It is important to note that this guidance does not cover all circumstances plans may face. Nor does it significantly inhibit, as some have warned, the investment in environmental, social and governance (ESG) funds, which are intended to promote social goals.

 

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This article first examines ERISA’s investment regulatory regime. Then it considers the guidance provided under FAB 2018-01 as it applies to social investing in various benefit plan contexts.

 

By way of background, ERISA fiduciaries in selecting investments must act prudently and with the care, skill and diligence an expert would use. They must act solely for the benefit of plan participants. In addition, the examined investments must be consistent with the terms of the relevant plan documents unless compliance would be inappropriate under other statutory standards.

 

The DOL has promulgated regulations describing factors a prudent fiduciary must use in selecting investments. Among the factors identified were the diversification of the portfolio, liquidity of the assets relative to cash flow needs, the projected return of the investment relative to the plan’s funding objectives and the risk of loss associated with the investment. 

 

In the context of social investing, the department has had a long-standing position that ERISA fiduciaries may not sacrifice investment returns or assume greater investment risks as a means of promoting collateral social policy goals. Consequently, a question raised early on was, under what circumstances may a fiduciary consider noneconomic factors—i.e., social goals—in selecting investments. The DOL initially determined that social goals may be taken into account if economic considerations were equivalent between two alternative investments. In other words, noneconomic considerations are permitted to serve as a tiebreaker.

 

A fiduciary considering selecting any investment should ask the following two questions:

 

  • Is the type of investment appropriate for my plan? To answer this question in regard to investment funds that take into account social objectives, the ERISA investment fiduciary needs to examine the particular characteristics of the plan and the investment alternatives permitted under its governing document.

 

  • If the answer is yes, he should ask: Is the particular fund appropriate? This requires application of the investment guidance described above.

 

In the Field Assistance Bulletin, the DOL reminded us of its position: 

[B]ecause every investment necessarily causes a plan to forego other investment opportunities, plan fiduciaries are not permitted to sacrifice investment return or take on additional investment risk as a means of using plan investments to promote collateral social policy goals. IB 2015-01 also reiterated the view that when competing investments serve the plan’s economic interests equally well, plan fiduciaries can use such collateral considerations as tie-breakers for an investment choice.

The guidance later went on to state: 

ERISA fiduciaries must always put first the economic interests of the plan in providing retirement benefits. A fiduciary’s evaluation of the economics of an investment should be focused on financial factors that have a material effect on the return and risk of an investment based on appropriate investment horizons consistent with the plan’s articulated funding and investment objectives.

ESG factors may be relevant in evaluating an investment, but the department made clear that these considerations are not always material in evaluating a particular investment’s appropriateness. The structure and type of plan—for example, defined benefit (DB) vs. defined contribution (DC)—may be significant in determining the extent to which ESG factors may be taken into account when selecting investment opportunities.

The review that should occur before an investment is made in a fund that’s designed to provide collateral benefits depends on whether the investment decision will limit the ability of the plan to invest in another manner.

Investments in defined benefit (DB) plans should be made only after the two questions set out above can be answered in the affirmative. Investment decisions should be made based on economic criteria, and other concerns may be examined only if they are used to determine which among one or more equivalent investments is appropriate.

The analysis regarding defined contribution (DC) plans is varied depending on the nature of the investment account. Some of these plans vest all investment decisionmaking authority in one or more trustees or in another investment fiduciary. In these situations, the analysis and approach described for defined benefit plan investing should be followed.

Many DC plans afford a default investment, in the event a participant does not self-direct his account. The selection of a default option should comply with the foregoing analysis, and, in addition, the rules regarding default options should be addressed.

Often, the plans permit participants to choose from a menu of investment choices. In this situation, the fiduciary may select an ESG fund as one of the alternative investments. However, here the second question is critical and the fiduciary must determine that the particular fund is appropriate.

Finally, some DC plans permit participants to invest in a broad range of investments of the participant’s choosing. Here, the choices are not limited by a menu of alternatives. In this case, the plan fiduciaries need not address whether the participant’s decisions are appropriate under ERISA’s general fiduciary standards discussed in the recent department guidance.

ESG funds are growing in popularity. The ability of a plan to include these funds in its investment portfolio varies based on the type of plan and the extent to which plan fiduciaries, as contrasted with participants, make investment decisions.

 

Thomas M. White, a partner Rimon Law, specializes in benefits and executive compensation. He can be reached at Thomas.white@rimonlaw.com.

 

This feature is to provide general information only, does not constitute legal or tax advice, and cannot be used or substituted for legal or tax advice. Any opinions of the author do not necessarily reflect the stance of Strategic Insight or its affiliates.

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