PwC Finds Drop in Pension Discount Rates, Projected Returns

July 11, 2011 (PLANSPONSOR.com) - A new report finds a drop in pension and OPEB discount rates, while the median expected long-term rate of return on plan assets decreased approximately 10 basis points since 2009. 

 

PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Pension/OPEB 2011 Assumption and Disclosure Survey notes that pension and OPEB discount rates were approximately 40 to 50 basis points lower, on average, than discount rates at the end of 2009, reflecting the overall decline in long-term interest rates over that one-year period. The median pension discount rate at the end of 2010 was 5.40% (compared with 5.86% at the end of 2009) while the median OPEB discount rate at the end of 2010 was 5.25% (compared with 5.75% at the end 2009), according to the report.  The report notes that over the past five years, the discount rate has trended downward consistent with the overall movement of interest rates. 

Additionally, the median expected long-term rate of return on plan assets of 8.00% decreased approximately 10 basis points compared with 8.11% at the end of 2009. The report said that the decrease generally reflects more caution by companies in assessing expected returns on plan assets and changes in asset mix. 

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Report authors Ken Stoler and Gina Klein note that, at the median, plan funding levels improved somewhat, with pension plan assets increasing from 77% of the projected benefit obligation (PBO) at the end of 2009 to 81% at the end of 2010 – a shift attributed primarily to higher returns in the equity markets in 2010. Unamortized losses for pensions decreased from 36% of the projected benefit obligation at the end of 2009 to 33% at the end of 2010, in large part the report notes, due to actual returns on plan assets that were higher than expected. 

The survey was based on an analysis of 100 companies, comprising Fortune 100 and other large and established companies, with a December 31 measurement date.  Ten of the companies had frozen their plans as of 2010, a number that has been increasing each year, according to the report.  In 2007, only one company had a frozen plan, while six companies had a frozen plan in 2008, and eight companies had a frozen plan in 2009. 

Asset Allocation 

The survey also included a breakdown of asset allocations for funded pension plans, as of each plan’s measurement date. The final analysis showed that, at the median, approximately 52% of assets were allocated to equity securities and 32% were invested in debt instruments for 2010; a 4% decrease in assets allocated to equity, and assets allocated to debt instruments were approximately unchanged, compared to 2009, according to the report. At the median, nearly 12% of assets were allocated to all other investment categories (cash and cash equivalents, real estate, company stock and other), essentially remaining unchanged from 2009 levels. 

Pension Funding Levels 

The median and the mean ratio of pension funding (pension plan assets as a percentage of projected benefit obligation) increased to approximately 81% in 2010, compared to 77% and 79% respectively, in 2009, according to the report.  “This positive movement in the funded status of the pension plans is due in large part to the higher returns on plan assets in 2010, offset in part by declines in discount rates,” according to the report. 

For pension plans, unamortized losses as a percentage of the projected benefit obligation decreased from a median percentage of 36% in 2009 to 33% in 2010, due primarily to higher returns on plan assets, according to the PwC analsysis. 

For OPEB plans, unamortized losses as a percentage of the accumulated postretirement benefit obligation increased to a median percentage of 18% in 2010 compared to 16% in 2009. OPEB plans saw similar improvements in the percentage of unamortized losses to pension plans despite that many OPEB plans are unfunded, according to the report. 

The median percentage of prior service cost to the defined benefit obligation (projected benefit obligation for pension plans and accumulated postretirement benefit obligation for OPEB plans) remained nominal at approximately 0% for all plans in 2010, while on a combined pension and OPEB basis, the median funding level increased to approximately 73% in 2010 from 68% in 2009. 

OPEB Assumptions 

The mean OPEB discount rate for 2010 decreased 52 basis points to 5.22%. The median discount rate decreased 50 basis points from 2009 to 5.25% in 2010, decreases the PwC researchers characterized as “consistent with overall declines in interest rates from 2009 to 2010”. 

The mean initial health care rate decreased slightly for 2010, dropping 7 basis points to 8.07%, and the median initial rate remained unchanged at 8%.  Median ultimate trend rates stayed at 5%, and the median time to reach ultimate increased to 8 years, though a number of companies extended their years-to-ultimate to 11 years or more, according to the report. 

The PwC report was based on a review of the public annual reports for the companies selected, specifically financial information regarding pension and other postretirement benefit (OPEB) plans.    

IMHO: “Starting” Points

July 11, 2011 (PLANSPONSOR.com) - You may have missed it, but there was a bit of a “dust up” in our industry last week. 

It started on July 7 when TheWall Street Journal ran a front-page story titled “401(k) Law Suppresses Saving for Retirement” (a story that is still, as I write on Saturday morning, on WSJ.com’s most popular listing).  And, no, that article wasn’t talking about discrimination testing rules, the imposition of annual contribution limits, talk of a mandatory limit on loans, or the imposition of mandatory annuitization of distributions.  Rather, it was talking about…automatic enrollment. 

The report claimed that “40% of new hires at companies with automatic enrollments are socking away less money than they would if left to enroll voluntarily,” citing data from the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI).  The problem, according to the report, was that “[m]ore than two-thirds of companies set contribution rates at 3% of salary or less, unless an employee chooses otherwise.” 

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Well, duh.  That, as they say, is the law.  

EBRI quickly took issue with the WSJ’s characterizations, outlining in some detail the non-partisan group’s extensive history in examining these trends, and then noted that “The Wall Street Journal article reported only the most pessimistic set of assumptions,” failing to “cite any of the other 15 combinations of assumptions reported in the study” referenced in the report.  More significantly, EBRI’s Jack VanDerhei commented later that same day that the WSJ managed to completely ignore the reality that automatic enrollment is “increasing savings for many more—especially the lowest-income 401(k) participants.” 

Now, while EBRI was, IMHO, rightly miffed to see its data and analysis mis-, or perhaps less-than-fully, represented, the authors of the Pension Protection Act were no less maligned.  The law was designed to help more employers make it easier for more employees to become participants, and for those participants to become more-effective retirement savers, and it seems to me that, in just about every way, it has been a huge success.   

Are there those who once might have filled out an enrollment form and opted for a higher rate of deferral (say to the full level of match) that now take the “easy” way and allow themselves to be automatically enrolled at the lower rate called for by the PPA?  Absolutely.  However, as the EBRI data show—and, for anyone paying attention, have shown for years now—the folks most likely to be disadvantaged by that choice are higher-income workers, most of whom, IMHO, should know better.   

The simple math of automatic enrollment is that you get more people participating, albeit at lower rates (until design features like contribution acceleration kick in).  Said another way, participation rates go up, and AVERAGE deferral rates dip—initially.1  Then, over time, as contribution-acceleration designs take hold, we’re likely to see those average deferral rates increase2.  But for some, it will mean less savings, and for many, perhaps not savings enough.   

There are, however, some things plan sponsors can do now to keep things moving in the right direction sooner: 

Auto-enroll workers at higher rates, perhaps as high as the level at which they will receive the full company match.  Sure, the Pension Protection Act calls for 3% as a minimum to be eligible for its safe harbor—but there’s no law/rule that says you can’t go higher. 

Auto-enroll ALL workers, not just new hires.  Since the PPA’s introduction, PLANSPONSOR’s DC Survey has consistently shown that two-thirds of employers adopting automatic enrollment do so on a PROSPECTIVE basis (see IMHO: A Prospective Perspective).  Do you really care more for the people you just hired than those who have devoted years of loyal service? 

Remind ALL participants of the importance of actively saving for retirement.  It may be a bit counter-intuitive to try to reach automatically enrolled participants who didn’t even take the time/expend the energy to fill out an enrollment form, but it’s important.  By most measures, workers who save only to the level of the company match won’t have saved enough to provide a financially secure retirement.  However, a generation of participant behaviors suggests that they assume that saving to the level of the match is the “right” answer, and it’s likely that they will assume that the level of automatic enrollment established is “enough.”  We all know better. 

IMHO, automatic enrollment designs are, literally, a starting point—for plan sponsors and their soon-to-be participant savers alike (3).   

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The WSJ article is online HERE.  EBRI’s response is at https://ebriorg.wordpress.com/    

1 Complicating the picture is that the PPA took hold just ahead of an economic downturn that led a small, but noticeable, group of employers to reduce and/or suspend their match (and a not-so-small group to lay off lots of workers), while health-care costs continued to rise and, based on previous surveys, likely siphoned some participant contributions from retirement savings.   

2 VanDerhei notes on EBRI’s blog that “[t]he other statistic attributed to EBRI dealt with the percentage of AE-eligible workers who would be expected to have larger tenure-specific worker contribution rates had they been VE-eligible instead. The simulation results we provided showed that approximately 60 percent of the AE-eligible workers would immediately be better off in an AE plan than in a VE plan, and that over time (as automatic escalation provisions took effect for some of the workers), that number would increase to 85 percent.” 

(3) This from a column I wrote about automatic enrollment designs in 2005: “More troubling still – there is at least one published study that indicates that, over time, the establishment of a default deferral rate seems to lower the overall rate of deferrals in the plan.  Mostly, this seems to be a result of an increase in the number of workers who simply leave their choices in the hands of the default option.  But it is hardly beyond the realm of reason to imagine a scenario where workers take the establishment of a default rate as being the “right” answer for them as well. 

 

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