December 3, 2004 (PLANSPONSOR.com) - Pennsylvania
Governor Edward Rendell has vetoed a bill that would have
taxed compensation from a nonqualified deferred compensation
plan when it was received - not when it was
deferred.
Rendell rejected HB 176, which business lobbyists said
would have brought the Keystone State in line with the tax
policy of the federal government and every other state,
citing concerns that the measure would have cost the state
a significant amount of revenue.
requires employees to pay personal income tax at the
time the compensation is deferred. The state also doesn’t
allow pre-tax deferrals into 401(k) plans.
“As long as I am Governor, I intend to enforce a
‘pay as you go’ budget process for Pennsylvania,” Rendell
said in his
veto message
to the General Assembly, which approved the bill November
20. “There will be no significant increases in spending
or reductions in revenue without a specific plan to pay
for them.”
While state lawmakers may have only meant to change
the rules for nonqualified deferred compensation plans,
Rendell said he was concerned that language in the bill
could allow employers to use the tax approach for all DC
plans – a development Rendell said would have cost the
state an estimated $220 million a year in lost
revenues.
Business community lobbyists weren’t happy with
Rendell’s move.
“Under the Department of Revenue’s interpretation,
Pennsylvania law is contrary to federal law and the laws
of any other state in the nation,” Jim Welty, vice
president of legislative and corporate affairs for the
Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry, said in
a statement
. “Not only does our law defeat the purpose of deferred
compensation arrangements, which is to provide tax
benefits to participants, it serves as a deterrent to
attracting and keeping employers in the state, and
represents yet another factor that would discourage
companies from choosing the Commonwealth as a place in
which to do business.”
February 12, 2004 (PLANSPONSOR.com) - New
legislation was introduced this week by US Senators Peter G.
Fitzgerald (R- Illinois), Carl Levin (D-Michigan), and Susan
Collins (R-Maine) that would attempt to reform the mutual
fund industry, notably by "terminating certain questionable
fund industry arrangements.
That would include revenue sharing and eliminating SEC
Rule 12b-1, which the Senators said has been a “bonanza for
brokers and advisors but has not succeeded in lowering fund
costs for shareholders.”
This week, we asked readers what they thought new
legislation might bring.
The most common response, roughly a third (
31.8%
) of this week’s respondents, was an opinion that the
legislation would cause fees to rise in other areas,
including the reader who said,
“If you change the money (12b-1) in the retirement plan
equation, then either services will drop (unlikely) or
sponsors will need to pay more.
Today the participants are bearing some of the cost of the
plan when fees are deducted from the funds.
If these aren’t available to pay recordkeeping costs or for
the cost of enrollment meetings, who is left to pay?
The plan sponsor?
Good guess.Washingtonlegislators always think they have a better answer.
Unfortunately, in this instance, it could mean the ability
to sponsor a plan may be out of the reach of some
employers.”
Still,
9%
said it was time to eliminate 12b-1 fees, and nearly one in
five (
19.7%
) said it was past time to do so.
Among the latter group was the reader who observed,
“I know exactly what I’m paying in fees, hate every bit
of it, and do all I can to avoid them. If the Senators can
get rid of this one, more power to them.”
However, another reader who thought it was time to do away
with them said,
“It is not the responsibility of our politicians to
protect us from stupidity.
If plan sponsors (except for very small plans) are paying
12b-1 fees, they are not fulfilling their fiduciary
responsibility.”
Roughly
18%
saw it all as an election ploy, and
10.6%
said it was a misguided attempt, including the reader who
called it
“…a typical knee jerk reaction from bureaucrats who have
little real work experience, and even less financial
services knowledge.
This will make matters worse.”
Only about
7%
thought the elimination was not an issue, and
6%
opted for “other,” usually some version of multiple
impacts, unintended results, or, as this reader said,
“disclosure … many sponsors receive valuable services
for the 12b-1 fees such as investment policy development
and maintenance, quarterly investment reports and trustee
meetings, and annual or semi-annual enrollment meetings and
investment education meetings.”
More common were responses like the reader who said,
“Yes, it is (c) a law that will cause fees to increase
in other areas, which makes it (d) a misguided attempt,
and, as with so much already in 2004, it is (e) a political
ploy in an election year.
For our participants it appears to be
f) not an issue, and it definitely is (g) time I figured
out how much we’re paying in 12b-1s.”
…before going on to admit,
“I don’t know how you are going to score this
answer.”
This week’s
Editor’s Choice
was, however, a call for clarity:
“What is really needed are reforms demanding full
disclosure of all costs for all investment products used in
a retirement platform – mutual funds, collective Trust
funds, group annuity products. A Plan Sponsor should not
have to be a super-detective to understand the fee
structure of his plan.”
Thanks to
everyone who participated in our survey!
Are these the same legislators who think that there is
not enough advice for investors? Are these the same
legislators who are concerned about short term trading?
Investors need ongoing advice which may be a buy and hold
strategy. Financial representatives should be able to be
compensated for their services. If the compensation turns
into strictly a front-end load, I believe that it will
increase the potential conflict of interest by forcing
financial representatives to recommend active trading
strategies. That said, the answer is c. The market place
would most like respond by simply charging the same fee in
another manner. Quality financial representatives
interested in providing sound, long term advice free from
conflict will simply charge a wrap fee. Another potential
impact is on plan recordkeeping fees if there is revenue
sharing from 12b-1's. Plan recordkeepers will simply
increase their fees proportionally. Again, the answer is
c.
(i) disclosure ... many sponsors receive valuable
services for the 12b-1 fees such as investment policy
development and maintenance, quarterly investment reports
and trustee meetings, and annual or semi-annual enrollment
meetings and investment education meetings.
If you change the money (12b-1) in the retirement plan
equation, then either services will drop (unlikely) or
sponsors will need to pay more.
Today the participants are bearing some of the cost of the
plan when fees are deducted from the funds.
If these aren't available to pay recordkeeping costs or for
the cost of enrollment meetings, who is left to pay?
The plan sponsor?
Good guess. Washington legislators always think they have a
better answer.
Unfortunately, in this instance, it could mean the ability
to sponsor a plan may be out of the reach of some
employers.
(f) Not an issue.
We can still comparison shop, so not an issue
I think the bill is c, d and e.
These days, the 12(b) 1 is payment for fund distribution
primarily, esp. for companies that do not have a sales
force to distribute its funds.
Brokers would need to be paid in some other way if there
were no 12(b) 1 fees.
It is interesting that the cost of 12(b) 1 payments is far
less expensive than the loads (back-end and front-end) that
are charged for these same funds.
I think there are a lot of factors that have led to
increased costs in mutual funds, particularly distribution
expenses to brokers and TPAs.
As bad as the situation seems, I think it is much better
with mutual funds than with insurance products used for
retirement plans, but I don't hear anyone talking about
that yet.
B. we have long needed a can of "12b-1 B Gone"
Remember the law of unintended consequences... almost
anytime the government starts a program to reduce or fix
something it only increases the something or breaks it even
worse.
I have yet to see, outside of military situations, a case
where the government did something better and more
efficiently than it could be done in private industry.
D a misguided attempt, a typical knee jerk reaction from
bureaucrats who have little real work experience, and even
less financial services knowledge.
This will make matters worse.
As a retirement consultant I am all for reforms that
allow Plan Sponsors to really see what they are paying for
the value of services they receive, but focusing only on
the 12b-1 fees is somewhat naive as there are so many
layers of fees, (i.e.. sub-advisory, trading, soft dollar
arrangements, asset based wraps, fees that pay for the
buildings housing the fund family, administrative offsets
to bundled providers) many of which are much more egregious
than the 12b-1. What is really needed are reforms demanding
full disclosure of all costs for all investment products
used in a retirement platform - mutual funds, collective
Trust funds, group annuity products. A Plan Sponsor should
not have to be a super-detective to understand the fee
structure of his plan.
B. I know exactly what I'm paying in fees, hate
every bit of it, and do all I can to avoid them. If the
Senators can get rid of this one, more power to them.
There are so many good answers to this question - Yes it
is (c) a law that will cause fees to increase in other
areas, which makes it (d) a misguided attempt, and, as with
so much already in 2004, it is (e) a political ploy in an
election year.
For our participants it appears to be f) not an
issue,
And it definitely is (g) time I figured out how much
we're paying in 12b-1s.
I don't know how you are going to score this answer.
Having been on both sides of the 12-b1 thing, I think we
should get rid of them.
There was no good way for our department to calculate them
and we didn't get the benefit to our bottom line (sales
took credit for them), so they were looked upon as sort of
a 'bonus' whenever they showed up.
My answer to your question on the repeal of the 12b-1
Fees is: C: a law that will cause fees to increase in other
areas.
As you know, many providers provide the PERCEPTION that
their fees to ER's and EE's are lower than others, but the
reason for that is the provider is getting some or all of
the 12b-1 fees back from the funds as a 'distribution' fee.
(I'm not naming any names, but my prior ER was set up that
way).
I have very mixed feelings about all this:
1. Everyone in business is allowed to make a profit --
that's what capitalism is all about!
It's just a question of HOW MUCH of a profit?
2. At the same time, those people who are supporting the
business should not be taken advantage of.
What's the appropriate amount of fees to pay when one
invests their money?
Should it be dependent upon the returns they receive?
Perhaps a percentage of a point for every percent of
return?
How much should Mutual Funds charge for their services?
Their knowledge? Their liability?
All very tough questions.
I believe the funds need to make a profit...but not to
the extent of gouging the participants.
I don't know what the correct answer is.
I do know that if the 12b-1 fees are removed, the powers
that be will be squeezing the balloon somewhere else!
They may not be called 12b-1's, but we will still see some
form of fee.
What an interesting dilemma for sponsors. It's all about
market timing anyway. We want participants more savvy but
that will only lead to more market timing. What have we
created......?
RE: 12b-1 or not 12b-1? That is the question. Answer:
B
My answer is (b), past time to get rid of 12(b) 1 fees.
And I would have said that back when I was a stockbroker.
The Street has to be cleaned up before what is left of its
credibility is lost.
In my view, totally eliminating the fee is not the right
fix.
Instead, the fee should be fund-specific. First, there may
be legitimate marketing and performance update costs that
help spark interest in the fund, which ultimately could
lead to a lower expense ratio.
Second, the broker of record looks for some form of payment
(but 25 basis points is far too high, given the precious
little ongoing service the broker provides).
At least the 12(b) 1 fee is identifiable, as opposed to
some unidentifiable/more questionable payment.
However, these and related administrative costs can be
quantified in a budget such that the typical fee can be far
less than 25-35 basis points.
Further, when the fund is closed to new clients, the
advertising part of the fee should be required to be
eliminated from the budget.
In my experience, when the broker of record gives way to a
non-broker financial advisor, the broker's payment should
also be immediately eliminated.
This has been an intractable problem leading to a broker
being paid long after he has ceased to be involved.
In 1986 I was researching mutual funds, and 12b1 came to
my attention, having to do with some Prudential bond funds
I believe.
The theory of course is that the manager takes a little
from the shareholder in order to make the fund bigger and
in the future take advantage of economies of scale, blah
blah. However, none of this has happened. I have not
researched it lately, but the last time I looked, costs to
fund holders have climbed steadily upward, notwithstanding
many funds reaching the sweet spot for costs. So the
shareholders have not benefited from this at all.
The other curious thing is that the fund managers have
not gained from it, either. Again, last time I looked,
which was a while ago, the profit margins of the public
management companies were not rising. What is coming in
from the shareholders is being paid out to intermediaries.
I don't know if that means big intermediaries, who shake
down the willing fund companies, or smaller intermediaries
like banks etc, with whom the funds are trying to extend
their reach. More likely than not it all accrues to the big
brokers.
So-- I think 12b1 is a scam; I thought it was a scam in
1986 when I first learned of it, and it is worse now
because of the betrayal of the economies of scale idea.
I think you have it right on more than one of the
multiple choices this week.
a) It is time to eliminate 12b-1 fees.
Rather than separate them, report all costs of the fund so
an informed investor can make a reasonable investment
decision.
Why should sales cost be any different than any other
expense?
c) It will cause other fees to rise.
It is like pushing down on one end of the inner tube, it
just bulges out the other side.
Honest funds will just reclassify the expenses and report
them in the "load".
e) An election year ploy?
It is, after all, an election year.
i) Something else: an honest effort to give investors a
fair shake or at least a start.
Once again, members of congress want to regulate
securities laws without looking at the impact that it will
have on the retirement industry in detail.
I believe there is a real benefit to revenue sharing
arrangements made with the mutual fund companies the
benefit plan sponsors in reducing plan expenses.
So this is another misguided attempt at congress trying to
regulate something it knows nothing about.
If 12b-1 fees are eliminated, especially in 401k plans,
the participants will wind up picking up more fees in other
areas.
You asked your readership to weigh in on the latest
12-b-1 discussion, so, here you go:
1.
Does anyone find it curious that NO ONE raised this issue
when the markets were performing?
2.
Which seemingly confirms my cynical conclusion that this
latest move is purely a political ploy and
3.
Will undoubtedly result in an increase in other fees.
Senator Fitzgerald...and by the way is he up for
re-election...."by making it easier for consumers to
compare funds....."
Does the distinguished Senator from Illinois know that
there are (roughly) thirteen thousand plus mutual funds
available and that the consumer...wrapped up in work
related and family related issues....has neither the desire
nor the education nor the time to compare mutual funds?
The 12-b-1 fee is clearly disclosed and not, as Senator
Fitzgerald asserts "obscure..."
In the prospectus I am reviewing (Oppenheimer Global)
the 12-b-1 fees charged by share class can clearly be found
on page 7.
If these three Senators with apparently nothing else to
concern them....like unemployment, taxes, or the
environment, would simply review the charges by share
class, their course of action would be clear.
12-b-1 fees are the highest in B and C shares (1%)
annually versus .23% in A shares
Therefore:
eliminate both B and C shares and revert back to a single
class (A) for it is only in A shares where expenses are
reasonable and the consumer through a letter of intent or
rights of accumulation can EVER qualify for a reduced sales
charge.
Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to vent my
spleen.
12b-1 fees are simply one component part of the total
fee and expense structure.
As long as all costs are properly disclosed, then the buyer
can decide for himself of herself whether the total costs
are excessive.
The real problem now, as I see it, is with trading costs,
which are not clearly disclosed.
Of course, one can argue that excessive trading costs
simply reduce gains (or increase losses), and so factor
into the net return results along with all of the discloses
costs.
However, investors should be given the information so that
they can easily determine how fund performance is affected
separately by costs on the one hand, vs. performance of the
assets held by the fund, on the other hand.
Survey:
C, D & E are correct in my opinion.
There is no free lunch.
If 12b-1 fees are eliminated new fees would appear.
With no 12b-1 fees, advisors would only be paid if
investors made changes.
That is often not in the best interest of the investor.
I think it is both (c) a law that will cause fees to
increase in other areas and (d) a misguided attempt.
12b-1 fees, in my experience, have gone back to the plan
by being used by the administrator to fund marketing,
education, etc.
Surely profit was made by them - I've yet to see a
not-for-profit mutual fund ever introduced.
If those were taken away, a whole new set of charges would
likely pop up on top of the usual administrative charges.
Thank you, Senators.
Now participants can complain that the fund choices they
have are charging too much. . .
It is truly way past time to eliminate 12 b-1 fees, but
only if we can foresee, or limit, their replacement
costs
Retirement plan providers and brokers (advisors, trust
officers and insurance folks included) that do not disclose
receipt of these fees will select d or e and loudly
proclaim unfairness forcing c.
Plan sponsors that have purchased retirement plan services
from the aforementioned providers/agents will select g or h
and when they get the fee increase letter (if the bill
passes) won't understand it.
Retirement plan providers and advisors that disclose all
fees and or work as a "fee for service" provider, returning
all 12b-1 type fees will select f.
Plan sponsors that have purchased retirement plan services
from one of these providers may select f, but more likely
will still select g or h because the entire subject is way
too confusing.
Once again, you've managed to pose a question with
multiple right answers.
In my view it's clearly a political ploy designed to
produce an issue that will interest voters.
I also strongly believe that the elimination of 12(b)1's
will lead to an increase of other fees.
In fact, many of those fees may be of the variety that will
require some 'splaining Lucy.
Change is inevitable and we can adjust but the product (and
cost) we end up with may make us wish for the "good old
days".
Interesting quiz on 12b-1 payments.
I would have to say that the subject of revenue sharing
payments is somewhat of a mess.
I think it is understood that profit margins have been
shrinking for most retirement plan providers.
Elimination of the 12b-1 payments would result in further
reduction of income for many of the providers that fail to
disclose receipt of those payments.
Disclosure is really the heart of this issue.
In a perfect world, every provider would fully disclose all
fees to clients and potential clients.
If this were done, all fees would be fully understood and
there would be no need to have any revenue sharing options.
The end result would be reduced fund expenses for our
clients, with understood and acceptable profit margins for
service providers.
We are a provider that offers a non-revenue sharing menu
with corresponding asset charge as well as a revenue
sharing menu with a reduced asset charge.
Our fees are same no matter how we slice it.
Fortunately, most providers don't fully disclose fees, and
that gives us an advantage in the sales process to punch
holes through existing arrangements.
On the down side, many sponsors are being overcharged and
they don't know it.
The other misunderstood fact is that overall fund
expenses are typically higher even after you subtract the
revenue sharing payments.
For example, if you pick a fund at random like the PIMCO
Low Duration fund which is a very good fund and fund
family, the institutional class expense is 43bps.
If you pick the same fund in the D share retail class, the
expense is 75bps with a 25bps 12b-1.
Therefore, the net expense is 7bps higher after you exclude
the 12b-1.
Thankfully, Morningstar generally rates revenue sharing
funds lower due to the expense.
I doubt that mutual fund lobbying will allow the
elimination of 12b-1 payments or Sub T/A payments, but it
sure would make the playing field level.
In the end, we could all make a profit while providing the
best possible retirement benefits to our population.
Until then, we can do our best to educate the HR and
Benefits community above the fees in their plans.
There would be so many unintended consequences for plan
sponsors. Elimination of 12b-1 fees would eliminate the
ability of many recordkeepers to include outside funds in
sponsors lineups, or if they did, it would drive up costs
significantly.
(i) Something else.
If Prissy worked in the Retirement Plan Services Fees
industry, her response would have to be . . ."I don't know
nothing about disclosing 12b-1 Fees".
Actually I think that all fees that are charged to a
mutual fund that reduce NAV should be specifically
disclosed in clear "SPD type" language.
Plan Sponsors should be able to do a cost accounting for
their plans.
I also think that Financial Institutions that offer various
mutual fund families as offerings should be compensated for
doing such and that should be clearly disclosed.
Service providers in this industry made a very inept
tactical error when they promote "no fee" services.
What this means of course is no explicit fees, and tons of
implicit ones.
It's time to fess up on the fees.
Eliminating 12(b)1 fees will probably cause fees in
other areas to increase. The move will make fund fees less
transparent.
Right now if I buy A shares, I know that the front load is
a sales charge, and it pays the person who advises me to
buy this fund.
If I have no advisor, I should not pay a sales charge; I
should buy no-load shares.
12(b) 1 fees are supposed to pay for distribution and
recordkeeping expenses. If someone is performing
distribution and recordkeeping services for me, such as a
bundled 401(k) provider, then I can reason that they're
getting paid from the fund's 12(b) 1 fee.
If no one is doing that for me, then I should question
whether I want to buy a fund with a high 12(b) 1 fee.
If 12(b) 1 fees are eliminated, fund companies will
still pay to get in the lineup of the major bundled plan
providers.
The money will probably come out of what the prospectus
calls "administrative expenses."
But when I see the description of administrative expenses,
I can't really tell what that money is for.
I don't know to what extent they're going to someone
outside of the fund company.
Disclosure takes a step backwards.
Regarding 12b1 fees…
As it pertains to small-to-mid 401(k) plans, 12b1 fees
are essential for many plan sponsors and participants.
Those plans tend to be serviced by brokers, bankers,
insurance agents, and consultants and these 12b1 fees are
their major source of revenues.
Without 12b1 fees, most, if not all, of the ongoing
revenues these service providers now receive would
disappear, leaving them no financial incentive to service
the plan year after year or even to bother working with the
plan in the first place.
Granted, Registered Investment Advisers, like my company,
can charge hard dollar fees to the employer for employee
education, performance measurement services, and search
consulting.
However, few small-to-mid size employers want to pay those
fees out of corporate dollars.
They consider it too expensive.
Plus, they feel, rightly so, that the services received for
these 12b1 fees for employee education, performance
measurement services, and search consulting are reasonable
expenses for the participants to pay for (via their mutual
funds' 12b1 fees) under ERISA.
Without 12b1 fees, most of the consulting or investment
firms who now provide services to 401(k) plans in exchange
for 12b1 fees will leave the 401(k) arena and look to other
types of clients to earn their living.
Then, who will educate the participants if the employer
doesn't want to pay for it out of corporate dollars?
Who is going to sit on the same side of the table with the
plan sponsor in objectively reviewing the 401(k) funds?
Some may think the 401(k) companies will pick up the slack.
However, that would be an expensive proposition since most
rely on outside investment professionals (paid through 12b1
fees) to handle this and they don't have in place the
expensive infrastructure to support such an endeavor for
all their 401(k) clients.
Also, do you really want to rely on your 401(k) provider to
report back on themselves regarding how their funds are
performing or how well their services are working?
That's why outside investment professionals are necessary
and need to be compensated.
For Washington to throw all types of investors into the
same category instead of making separate analyses simply
doesn't make sense.
If the people in Washington feel that 12b1 fees should be
eliminated, they must first understand the differences
between the various market segments of mutual fund buyers.
Individual investors may or may not need an investment
professional to help them with their investments.
If they don't need help, there are numerous no-load mutual
funds available that do not charge 12b1 fees.
If they do need help, the 12b1 fees pay for those services
via investment intermediaries.
In the retirement market, there has been much talk these
days over how people aren't saving enough for retirement
and need to be better educated.
Additionally, plan sponsors are in dire need of
professional assistance.
Washington must understand that this particular market
segment (i.e., 401(k) plans) needs the services of
investment professionals and that it is reasonable to pay
for these services via 12b1 fees.
Otherwise, if Washington feels that the 401(k) companies
should provide these services after eliminating 12b1 fees
(which effectively eliminates those companies whose
services are paid for with 12b1 fees), all that will happen
is the extra costs of servicing 401(k) plans will
eventually show up as increases in the internal operating
expenses of the mutual funds that the 401(k) companies use
- thus creating the expense of a 12b1-type fee without
labeling it as such.
For 401(k) providers, margins are pretty thin already.
Replacing the financial advisor's role will force further
consolidation in the industry and result in fewer choices
for plan sponsors.
Perhaps Washington should look at the "R" shares many
mutual fund companies have been issued over the past few
years.
These are special "Retirement" share classes used with
401(k) plans and include 12b1 fees to pay investment
professionals for their work.
If nothing else, Washington should allow R shares and their
12b1 fees to be used for 401(k) plans then deal with 12b1
fees from other share classes as a completely separate
issue.
The bottom line is that the elimination of or a drastic
reduction in 12b1 fees would hurt those people that
Washington wants to help: the 401(k) participants.
In response to your question of the day, I suspect that
the answer is "c" and "e."
Wrangling with the disclosures required and addressing the
bad deeds of a few by changing the rules for the many may
give us "C" a law that will cause fees to increase in other
areas.
Quite likely, this is also "E" a political ploy in an
election year.
The reality is that plan sponsors and their providers have
been both diligent and innovative in capturing the 12b-1
fees to offset the cost of plan administration, which,
rather than diminishing, has increased with the advent of
"advice" and other added services to participants.
Plan sponsors, their participants, and elected officials
should understand how the math of mutual funds works, but
should also acknowledge that benefits are not free.
The real focus should be on the overall expense ratios of
the funds offered - are they reasonable and below industry
averages - and the quality of advisory services and
shareholder services provided by those expense ratios.
Thanks for the opportunity to vent, Nevin!
C. As pension consultants the cases in which we are paid
by the 12b-1 fees, we would be forced to charge the clients
a fee.
Our fee schedule, which is extremely reasonable, in almost
all cases is much higher than what we receive the 12b-1s.
We have been rethinking being paid through 12b-1s because
in many cases we are only receiving about minimum wage, but
charging an outside fee can be a difficult sell in this
economic climate.
My myopic opinion is d.
My belief is that while some of the legislators concerns
may be valid in that 12b-1s do play a part in making
brokers wealthy, this does not take a global view of the
situation.
Brokers will find other ways to get rich; fund companies
will still need to distribute their product and those costs
will need to be borne somewhere; administrators such as my
company who retain some of the 12b-1 will need to find
another source to cover those costs.
Given these realities, the end user will wind up paying the
cost in one way or another - companies such as mine will
need to increase fees, sponsors will find a way to pass
along costs to their participants in the ever- increasing
world of employee-paid benefit costs, and the necessary
evil of distribution, the financial intermediary, will
still find a way to get their pound of flesh.
Not to mention, I still don't really get the connection
between the current market-timing/late trading situations
that have put the industry under a microscope and lower
fees/12b-1s.
Spitzer has politicized an issue comparing apples to
oranges and the misguided sound bite-oriented public has
swallowed the whole glass of Kool-aid.
Hopefully the tool will come to the realization that he
couldn't be elected governor of his apartment much less NY.
Not that I have an opinion.
I like your options, but I believe option (i),
"something else" would be most beneficial, as 12b-1 fees do
serve a place in the industry- provided that regulators
develop a more well-defined description of how they are to
be used.
Currently, I think there is some abuse of 12b-1s, but I
don't think that eliminating them is the answer.
The bad-apples just need some guidance (or a thorough
whipping with a wet noodle) so they don't ruin it for the
rest of us.
(e) A political ploy in an election year.
12 b-1 fees have always been a disclosure to investors.
If an investor did not want to purchase a fund that had a
12 b-1, no load funds were available.
This topic has and is often discussed in financial
literature readily available to investors.
i: something else.
But I also think this might cause fees to increase in
other areas. At least now you know how much of the fee is
SUPPOSED to go to 'distribution expenses.'
The reason I chose 'something else,' though, is that the
increasing competition - and commoditization of the
financial services industry in general - is a trend pushing
prices and fees lower. Some companies will use this event
to lower their fees, and will tout that.
I've got no idea so I suppose I'm in the (h) category
even though I dutifully chart our 12b-1 fees every year to
make sure they're in line similar funds.
Not sure what options I have if they aren't.
Mutual funds are a strange animal especially in years when
your $10,000 has turned into $8,000 and you have the
privilege of paying tax on $3,000 of capital (gains!)
Lately I have been really impressed with the information
Vanguards John Bogle has published on mutual funds.
The man loves graphs and charts so some of the reading gets
to be rough plowing but I'm convinced I'll be a lot smarter
when I've finished his Common Sense on Mutual Funds.
a & f.
It is not the responsibility of our politicians to protect
us from stupidity.
If plan sponsors (except for very small plans) are paying
12b-1 fees they should are not fulfilling their fiduciary
responsibility.
d.) Misguided.
This is a way to offer funds other than just your
Primary Provider/Recordkeepers funds.
We consider the attractiveness of the fund when selecting
it and the 12(b) 1 fee (and all other expenses) is all part
of the equation.